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PAGE 01 NAIROB 11468 061328Z
ACTION SCT-00

INFO	LOG-00	ACDA-10	ACDE-00	AF-01	AID-00	A-00	ACQ-01
	CA-02	CCO-00	CG-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-01	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	H-01	IMMC-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	INSE-00	IO-00	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00	NEA-01
	NRCE-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	OIC-02	OIS-01	OMB-01
	PA-00	PM-00	PRS-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	DRL-09
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R 061324Z AUG 96
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0772
INFO AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMCONSUL JEDDAH
AMEMBASSY RIYADH
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY ASMARA

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FROM EMBASSY KHARTOUM OFFICE

LONDON FOR YOUNG, PARIS FOR MORAN

E.O. 12958: NA

TAGS: PTER, PINR, PREL, SU

SUBJECT: SUDAN: MAJOR USAMA BIN LADEN ASSET DE-
REGISTERED

1. (U) PUBLIC INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO EMBASSY
KHARTOUM STAFF HAS IT THAT RENEGADE SAUDI TERRORISM
FINANCIER USAMA BIN LADEN OPERATED FOUR COMPANIES IN
SUDAN:

-- WADI-ALAGEEG CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, A MAJOR ROAD-
BUILDING FIRM;
-- TABBA FOR INVESTMENT, A GENERAL TRADING COMPANY;
-- EL-THIMAR AL-MOBARK AGRICULTURAL COMPANY, DEALING
WITH AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS IN THE RENK AREA OF UPPER
NILE STATE. BIN LADEN OWNS A FARM IN THE SOBA AREA, 15
KM SOUTH OF KHARTOUM;
-- KHARTOUM TANNERY.

BIN LADEN WAS SAID TO BE IN THE PROCESS OF BUYING THE
GEZIRA TANNERY FROM THE GOS, BUT DID NOT SUCCEED.

2. (SBU) EMBASSY INQUIRIES HAVE PRODUCED RECENT RUMOR
THAT TABBA FOR INVESTMENT EITHER HAS BEEN OR IS ABOUT
TO BE DEREGISTERED BY THE COMMERCIAL REGISTRAR GENERAL.
MEANWHILE, OFFICAL DAILY INGAZ AL-WATTANI OF 6 AUGUST
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PUBLISHED THE FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT:

BEGIN TEXT. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
THE COMMERCIAL REGISTRAR GENERAL

SUBJECT: CANCELLATION OF WADI ALAGEEG FOR TRADE AND
CONTRACTING CO. LTD

IT WAS DECIDED THAT WADI ALAGEEG FOR TRADE AND
CONTRACTING CO. LTD, BE CANCELLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
ARTICLE 238 OF THE COMPANIES ACT, 1925.

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ISSUED ON JULY 31, 1996

ABDEL RAHMAN AHMED IBRAHIM
THE COMMERCIAL REGISTRAR GENERAL. END TEXT.

3. (SBU) COMMENT. VARIOUS DISCUSSIONS DURING EMBASSY
KHARTOUM STAFF 17-27 JULY VISIT, INCLUDING WITH SENIOR
INTERLOCUTORS, FEATURED THE POINT THAT VERIFICATION OF
DISPOSAL OF USAMA BIN LADEN'S ASSETS THROUGH PUBLIC
RECORDS OF SALE SHOULD BE EASY TO DO. ONE NIF
INTERLOCUTOR CONTENDED THAT THE PROCESS, WHERE IT
INVOLVED SALE, RATHER THAN SWAP OF COMPANIES OR LAND
FOR OTHER ASSETS, MIGHT TAKE A WHILE AS BUYERS NORMALLY
CANNOT QUICKLY RAISE LARGE AMOUNTS OF MONEY TO PAY
CASH. STAFF WILL FOLLOW UP ON FURTHER DETAILS,
INCLUDING THE PROVISIONS OF THE COMPANIES ACT INVOKED.

4. ASMARA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED

FOSTER

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PAGE 01 ISLAMA 06863 01 OF 02 141257Z
ACTION SS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 SAS-00 /000W
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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9988
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 006863

EXDIS

DECAPTIONED

DEPT FOR P, SA, SA/PAB, AND S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/14/08
TAGS: PTER, KISL, ASEC, PHUM, AF
SUBJ: AFGHANISTAN: DEMARCHE TO TALIBAN ON NEW BIN LADIN THREAT

REFS: (A) STATE 168559
- (B) SA/PAB-EMBASSY ISLAMABAD 9/13 TELCON
- (C) ISLAMABAD 6809

(U) CLASSIFIED BY ALAN EASTHAM, DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION.
REASONS: 1.5 (C) (D).

1. (C) SUMMARY: IN A SEPTEMBER 13 MEETING WITH TALIBAN OFFICIAL
ABDUL HAKIM MUJAHID, DCM DEPLOYED REF A COUNTERTERRORISM TALKING
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POINTS IN THEIR ENTIRETY. MUJAHID REPLIED THAT THE U.S. SHOULD
EXERCISE "PATIENCE" ON THE BIN LADIN ISSUE. HE CLAIMED THAT
TALIBAN LEADER MULLAH OMAR IS THE KEY SUPPORTER OF HIS CONTINUED
PRESENCE IN THE COUNTRY, WHILE 80 PERCENT OF TALIBAN OFFICIALS
OPPOSE IT. THE TALIBAN WILL DEAL WITH THE ISSUE AFTER THE WAR IS
OVER. DCM RESPONDED THAT BIN LADIN HAS PUT THE TALIBAN AND THE
U.S. ON A COLLISION COURSE; IT IS TIME FOR THE TALIBAN TO DEAL WITH
HIM AND HIS NETWORK. MUJAHID SAID THE TALIBAN HAVE "SHORTCOMINGS"
AND THE WORLD SHOULD NOT EXPECT TOO MUCH FROM THEM. DCM, NOTING
REPORTS THAT THE TALIBAN HAVE SEIZED BAMİYAN, A SHI'A MAJORITY
AREA, URGED THE TALIBAN TO PROTECT THE PEOPLE OF THAT AREA FROM
HARM. END SUMMARY.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN S BLODGETT
DATE/CASE ID: 23 OCT 2006 200602966

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MAKING U.S. POINTS

2. (C) DCM MET SEPTEMBER 13 WITH ABDUL HAKIM MUJAHID, THE TALIBAN DESIGNEE TO HEAD THEIR NEW YORK OFFICE AND FORMER "AMBASSADOR" TO PAKISTAN. DCM DEPLOYED REF A COUNTERTERRORISM TALKING POINTS IN THEIR ENTIRETY, EMPHASIZING THAT THE TALIBAN WOULD BE HELD DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY FURTHER TERRORIST ACTS INSTIGATED BY BIN LADIN. HE NOTED THAT THE SAME POINTS HAD BEEN USED EARLIER IN THE DAY IN A CONVERSATION BETWEEN DEPARTMENT AND MAULAWI WAKIL AHMED (REF B), A KEY ASSISTANT TO TALIBAN LEADER MULLAH OMAR. MUJAHID TOOK WRITTEN NOTES OF THE POINTS, PROMISING TO CONVEY THEM TO WAKIL AHMED IN KANDAHAR. (NOTE: MUJAHID CALLED EMBASSY ON SEPTEMBER 14 TO CONFIRM THAT HE HAD PROVIDED THE POINTS TO WAKIL.)

MUJAHID'S REMARKS

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3. (C) IN RESPONSE TO US. POINTS, MUJAHID MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS:

-- HE SAID HE HAD CHECKED EARLIER IN THE DAY WITH WAKIL AHMED, AND ALTHOUGH REPORTS THAT USAMA BIN LADIN HAD BEEN PLACED UNDER "HOUSE ARREST" WERE INACCURATE, THE TALIBAN HAVE WARNED HIM ONCE AGAIN NOT TO ENGAGE IN POLITICAL OR PRESS ACTIVITIES. IN ADDITION, THE TALIBAN HAVE TAKEN AWAY ALL OF HIS "INSTRUMENTS OF COMMUNICATION." THE SOURCE OF PRESS REPORTS (SEE REF C) THAT BIN LADIN WAS UNDER "HOUSE ARREST" PROBABLY WERE BIN LADIN'S ALLIES WHO WERE TRYING TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE TALIBAN.

-- MUJAHID ADDED THAT HE HAD PERSONALLY URGED WAKIL AHMED TO ENSURE THAT THE TALIBAN FULLY CONTROL BIN LADIN'S ACTIVITIES.

-- VERY FEW AFGHANS ARE IN FAVOR OF BIN LADIN'S PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN. EIGHTY PERCENT OF THE TALIBAN LEADERSHIP OPPOSES HIS PRESENCE, INCLUDING TALIBAN DEPUTY LEADER MULLAH RABBANI, WAKIL AHMED, AND "ACTING MINISTER OF MINES" MULLAH JAN. MULLAH OMAR IS THE MAJOR SUPPORTER OF BIN LADIN. KANDAHAR "GOVERNOR" MULLAH HASSAN MAY ALSO SUPPORT BIN LADIN'S PRESENCE.

-- THE TALIBAN ARE MADE UP OF "10 SEPARATE GROUPS." THEY ARE ONLY UNITED BY THE DESIRE TO DEFEAT "THE WARLORDS" AND END "CHAOS." ONCE THIS TASK IS COMPLETED, AND THE WAR IS OVER, THE DIFFERENT TALIBAN GROUPS WILL FIGHT AMONG THEMSELVES, AND

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ISSUES LIKE BIN LADIN AND THE TREATMENT OF WOMEN WILL BE DEALT
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WITH IN A POSITIVE WAY. HE GAVE SEVERAL CITATIONS FROM THE
QURAN/SUNNA IN SUPPORT OF EQUAL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN.

-- IT IS A COMPLEX ISSUE; THE TALIBAN CANNOT SIMPLY PUSH BIN
LADIN OUT BECAUSE THEY WILL THEN FALL UNDER PRESSURE FROM
OTHER MUSLIMS. HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO MUJAHID, THE END RESULT
WILL BE THAT BIN LADIN WILL ONE DAY LEAVE AFGHANISTAN.

-- THEREFORE, THE U.S. SHOULD BE "PATIENT" AND "ACT WISELY."
THE ISSUE OF BIN LADIN WILL BE DEALT WITH.

TALIBAN MUST ACT ON BIN LADIN ISSUE

4. (C) DCM REPLIED THAT AS LONG AS BIN LADIN REMAINED IN
AFGHANISTAN AND WAS THREATENING THE U.S., THE U.S. RESERVED THE
RIGHT TO ACT IN SELF-DEFENSE. THE U.S. IS NOT PICKING A FIGHT WITH
THE TALIBAN; OUR PROBLEM IS BIN LADIN AND HIS NETWORK. HOWEVER, IF

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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9989
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 ISLAMABAD 006863

EXDIS

DEPT FOR P, SA, SA/PAB, AND S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/14/08
TAGS: PTER, KISL, ASEC, PHUM, AF
SUBJ: AFGHANISTAN: DEMARCHE TO TALIBAN ON NEW BIN LADIN THREAT

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THE TALIBAN CONTINUE TO OFFER BIN LADIN SANCTUARY, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE TALIBAN WOULD CONTINUE TO SUFFER. THE TALIBAN SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT AS LONG AS BIN LADIN REMAINS IN AFGHANISTAN THEY WILL BE ASSOCIATED WITH HIS OBJECTIVES, WHICH INCLUDE AN EXPRESSED DESIRE TO KILL AMERICANS. U.S./TALIBAN RELATIONS ALREADY HAVE ENOUGH PROBLEMS THAT THE TALIBAN SHOULD DISASSOCIATE THEMSELVES FROM MURDER. THE U.S. HAS REPEATEDLY URGED THE TALIBAN TO DEMONSTRATE THAT IT CAN ACT RESPONSIBLY. HOWEVER, ON COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTERNARCOTICS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE NEED
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FOR NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE FACTIONS, THE TALIBAN HAVE MADE NO PROGRESS. AT THIS TIME, THE ISSUE OF BIN LADIN HAS PUT THE TALIBAN AND THE U.S. ON A COLLISION COURSE; IT IS TIME FOR THE TALIBAN TO DEAL WITH THE BIN LADIN ISSUE.

TALIBAN "SHORTCOMINGS"

5. (C) MUJAHID RESPONDED THAT IT WAS AN UNFORTUNATE FACT, BUT THE TALIBAN HAVE MANY "SHORTCOMINGS" AND WERE NOT USED TO GOVERNING. MANY ISSUES HAVE BEEN MISHANDLED, INCLUDING RELATIONS WITH IRAN. THE TALIBAN'S FOREIGN POLICY WAS A DISASTER. MUJAHID CLAIMED THAT HE HAS TRIED TO MEET WITH MULLAH OMAR TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES, BUT OMAR WOULD NOT MEET HIM BECAUSE HE WAS ALWAYS BUSY WITH THE WAR EFFORT. NONETHELESS, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD NOT EXPECT THE TALIBAN TO BECOME A NORMAL GOVERNMENT TOO QUICKLY. IT WILL TAKE A LONG TIME. ALL THAT SAID, THE WEST SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THE TALIBAN ARE A "TRADITIONALIST" MOVEMENT; THEY ARE NOT "REVOLUTIONARY" MUSLIMS. IN ADDITION, THE U.S. AND THE TALIBAN WILL BE INEVITABLY DRAWN TOGETHER BECAUSE OF REGIONAL FACTORS, INCLUDING A COMMON DISLIKE OF IRAN. THE BEST WAY FOR THE U.S. TO DEAL WITH THESE ISSUES IS TO MAKE "CONCESSIONS" TO THE TALIBAN AND KEEP IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THEM. DCM RETORTED THAT WE HAVE BEEN TRYING FOR TWO YEARS TO POINT THE TALIBAN TOWARD STEPS IT COULD TAKE TO ELICIT POSITIVE GESTURES FROM THE U.S. WE ARE STILL WAITING.

URGING TALIBAN TO RESTRAIN THEMSELVES IN BAMBIAN

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6. (C) AT THE END OF THE CONVERSATION, DCM, NOTING REPORTS THAT BAMBIAN HAD FALLEN TO THE TALIBAN EARLIER IN THE DAY, TOLD MUJAHID

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THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE TALIBAN TO ENSURE THAT THE PEOPLE OF BAMIYAN, PARTICULARLY THE SHI'AS, WERE PROTECTED. MANY SHI'AS HAD REPORTEDLY BEQED BY THE TALIBAN WHEN MAZAR-I-SHARIF WAS TAKEN (ON AUGUST 8). IF THIS HAPPENED AGAIN, IT WOULD BE DISASTROUS FOR THE TALIBAN, DCM SAID. IRAN, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS CLOSELY WATCHING TALIBAN BEHAVIOR. IN ADDITION, IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT THE TALIBAN PROTECT THE BAMIYAN BUDDHA STATUES FROM HARM. SOME COMMANDERS HAVE THREATENED TO DESTROYED THESE STATUES. MUJAHID REPLIED THAT THE SHI'AS IN BAMIYAN WERE OPPOSING THE "NATIONAL" (TALIBAN) GOVERNMENT AND HAD TO BE DEFEATED. IN TERMS OF THE BUDDHA STATUES, MULLAH OMAR HAD ALREADY ORDERED THAT THEY WOULD BE PROTECTED.

COMMENT

7. (C) THOUGH HIS COMMENTS DURING THE HOUR-LONG CONVERSATION WERE OFTEN CONTRADICTORY AND SEEMED DESIGNED TO DISTANCE HIS ATTITUDES FROM THE TALIBAN, MUJAHID SEEMED TO HEAR OUR MESSAGE ON BIN LADIN. HOWEVER, IT HAS LONG BEEN KNOWN THAT MUJAHID -- A TALIBAN "MODERATE" -- WAS NOT CLOSE TO MULLAH OMAR, WHO CALLS THE TALIBAN'S SHOTS, AND THE CONVERSATION TENDED TO UNDERSCORE THE LIMITS OF MUJAHID'S INFLUENCE IN KANDAHAR. HIS REMARKS WERE FRANK AND DEFINITELY THE BEST GIVE-AND-TAKE WE HAVE HAD WITH ANY TALIBAN OFFICIAL ON BIN LADIN. MUJAHID APPEARED TO BELIEVE STRONGLY THAT OMAR IS BIN LADIN'S MAIN PROTECTOR AND THAT MOST OF THE TALIBAN LEADERSHIP DO NOT FAVOR HIS PRESENCE. (NOTE: IT HAS BEEN WELL-KNOWN THAT OMAR WAS STRONGLY IN FAVOR OF BIN LADIN'S PRESENCE; THE

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ATTITUDES OF OTHER TALIBAN LEADERS HAVE BEEN LESS CLEAR.) OTHER EMBASSY SOURCES HAVE ALSO MENTIONED MUJAHID'S POINT THAT OMAR WILL PROBABLY REMAIN IN POWER AT LEAST UNTIL THE WAR IS OVER, WHEN THE JOCKEYING FOR POWER WILL BEGIN. GIVEN OMAR'S STAYING POWER INTO THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, MUJAHID DID NOT SEEM TO HAVE MUCH CONFIDENCE THAT THE TALIBAN WILL DEAL WITH THEIR BIN LADIN PROBLEM IN THE NEAR-TERM, WHICH IS WHY HE COUNSELED THE U.S. TO EXERCISE "PATIENCE." WE WERE CAREFUL TO CONVEY IMPATIENCE.
MILAM

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INFO	LOG-00	AF-00	AIT-03	AMAD-01	AEX-01	AS-01	A-00
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	EAP-01	EUR-01	FSI-00	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	L-01	MCO-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00	NEA-01	DCP-01
	NSAE-00	OIG-03	PA-00	SSO-00	USIE-00	VO-03	SA-01
	R-00	SGHD-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	SAS-00	/025R	

DRAFTED BY: S/CT: JOE REAP
APPROVED BY: S/S-O: DAVE R FETTER
CA:BALLEN

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 184471

INFORM CONSUL

E.O. 12958; N/A
TAGS: CVIS

FOLLOWING STATE 184471 DATED 09/30/99 SENT ACTION ALL
DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO:

QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 184471

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PAGE 02 STATE 184471 080145Z
E.O. 12958: DECL: (OCTOBER 8, 1999 12:00 NOON EDT)
TAGS: PTER, OPRC
SUBJECT: DESIGNATION OF FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

CLASSIFIED BY JOHN LIMBERT, DEPUTY COORDINATOR FOR
COUNTERTERRORISMS/CT. REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D).
1. (C) BEGIN SUMMARY: THE 8 OCTOBER 1999 ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE
SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE DESIGNATION OF "FOREIGN TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS" IS LIKELY TO ATTRACT MEDIA COVERAGE AND
OFFICIAL INTEREST IN SOME COUNTRIES. CHIEFS OF MISSION AND
PUBLIC DIPLOMACY SECTIONS SHOULD CONSIDER GOVERNMENT-TO-
GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AS WELL AS PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIONS
APPROPRIATE TO THE LOCAL ENVIRONMENT. INSTRUCTIONS FOR
SELECTED MISSIONS WILL FOLLOW BY SEPTTEL. END SUMMARY

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN S BLODGETT
DATE/CASE ID: 23 OCT 2006 200602966

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2. (C) ON 1 OCTOBER 1999 THE SECRETARY OF STATE, AS REQUIRED BY THE ANTI-TERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996, WILL DESIGNATE "FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS." UNDER THE STATUTE, THE SECRETARY MUST MAKE THESE DESIGNATIONS AT

LEAST EVERY TWO YEARS. DETAILS ON THE HISTORY, PROCESS, AND EFFECTS OF THE DESIGNATIONS ARE PROVIDED BELOW.

3. (C) THE 1999 LIST CONTAINS 28 DESIGNATIONS; THE 1997 LIST DESIGNATED 30 ORGANIZATIONS. THREE WERE DROPPED, ONE WAS ADDED, AND 27 ARE REDESIGNATED.

4. (C) THE DEMOCRATIC FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (DFLP) AND MANUEL RODRIGUEZ PATRIOTIC FRONT DISSIDENTS (FPMR/D) WERE DROPPED DUE TO LACK OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY.

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5. (C) THE KHMER ROUGE WAS DROPPED BECAUSE IT HAS EFFECTIVELY CEASED TO EXIST.

6. (C) AL-QA'IDA, THE ORGANIZATION/NETWORK BEHIND THE BOMBINGS OF OUR EMBASSIES IN KENYA AND TANZANIA, IS ADDED.

7. (C) SINCE THE LIST CONTAINS NO MAJOR CHANGES OR SURPRISES, DEPARTMENT DOES NOT ANTICIPATE THAT THE LIST WILL ATTRACT WIDE ATTENTION IN THE U.S. THE LIST IS LIKELY, HOWEVER, TO ATTRACT COVERAGE AND PROVOKE CONTROVERSY IN COUNTRIES HAVING AN INTEREST IN ONE OR MORE OF THE GROUPS.

8. (C) ADVANCE, CLEARED, UNCLASSIFIED MATERIAL IS BEING PROVIDED TO PAOS VIA USIS CHANNELS. SUGGEST CHIEFS OF MISSION CONSULT WITH THEIR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY OFFICERS TO DETERMINE THE PUBLIC STANCE MOST APPROPRIATE FOR THEIR ENVIRONMENT. USIA HAS TOLD US THEY PLAN TO TRANSLATE THE MATERIAL INTO THE MAJOR LANGUAGES.

9. (C) POSTS MAY WANT TO USE THAT SAME MATERIAL TO INFORM INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS PRIVATELY AHEAD OF THE 8 OCTOBER PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT.

10. (C) DESIGNATED FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, 1999. (NB: UNCLASSIFIED DESCRIPTIONS OF THESE AND OTHER TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS ARE AVAILABLE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT PUBLICATION "PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 1998." THE ENTIRE PUBLICATION IS ON BOTH THE STATE AND USIA WEB PAGES.)

- ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION (ANO)

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- ABU SAYYAF GROUP (ASG)
- ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP (GIA)
- AUM SHINRIYKYO (AUM)
- BASQUE FATHERLAND AND LIBERTY (ETA)
- HAMAS (ISLAMIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT)
- HARAKAT UL-MUJAHIDIN (HUM)
- HIZBALLAH (PARTY OF GOD)
- GAMA'A AL-ISLAMIYYA (ISLAMIC GROUP, IG)
- JAPANESE RED ARMY (JRA)
- AL-JIHAD
- KACH
- KAHANE CHAI
- KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY (PKK)
- LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL ELAM (LTTE)
- MUJAHEDIN-E KHALQ ORGANIZATION (MEK, MKO, NCR AND OTHERS)

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- NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY (ELN)
- PALESTINE ISLAMIC JIHAD-SHAQAQI FACTION (PIJ)
- PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT-ABU ABBAS FACTION (PLF)
- POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP)
- POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE-GENERAL
COMMAND (PFLP-GC)
- AL-QA'IDA

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- REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA (FARC)
- REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION 17 NOVEMBER (17 NOVEMBER)
- REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY/FRONT (DHKP/C)
- REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE (ELA)
- SHINING PATH (SENDERO LUMINOSO, SL)
- TUPAC AMARU REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT (MRTA)

11. (U) BACKGROUND:

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(U) LEGAL EFFECTS OF DESIGNATION

- A) UNLAWFUL FOR A PERSON IN THE U.S. OR SUBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION OF U.S. TO PROVIDE FUNDS OR OTHER MATERIAL SUPPORT TO AN FTO
- B) ALIENS CAN BE DENIED VISAS OR EXCLUDED IF THEY ARE MEMBERS OR REPRESENTATIVES OF AN FTO
- C) U.S. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS MUST BLOCK FUNDS OF FTOS AND THEIR AGENTS AND REPORT THE BLOCKAGE.

12. (U) THREE CRITERIA FOR DESIGNATION

(U) THE THREE CRITERIA ARE:

- A. THE ORGANIZATION MUST BE FOREIGN.
- B. THE ORGANIZATION MUST ENGAGE IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY AS DEFINED IN SECTION 212 (A) (3) (B) OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT.
- C. THE ORGANIZATION'S ACTIVITIES MUST THREATEN THE SECURITY OF U.S. NATIONALS OR THE NATIONAL SECURITY (NATIONAL DEFENSE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OR THE ECONOMIC INTERESTS) OF THE UNITED STATES.

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13. (U) THE PROCESS

- (U) THE STATUTE REQUIRES THAT THE DESIGNATIONS BE SUBJECT

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TO JUDICIAL REVIEW. (FYI: THE LTTE AND THE MEK BOTH MOUNTED LEGAL CHALLENGES TO THEIR 1997 DESIGNATIONS AND LOST THEIR APPEALS.) THE RECOMMENDATIONS ON WHICH THE SECRETARY OF STATE BASED HER FINDINGS WERE MADE FOLLOWING AN EXHAUSTIVE INTERAGENCY EFFORT. WE HAVE KEPT AN ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD OF EACH RECOMMENDATION. BECAUSE THE RECORDS WOULD REVEAL INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS, THEY ARE AND WILL REMAIN CLASSIFIED.

14. (U) THE DESIGNATIONS EXPIRE IN TWO YEARS UNLESS RENEWED. THE LAW ALSO ALLOWS GROUPS TO BE ADDED AT ANY TIME FOLLOWING A DECISION BY THE SECRETARY, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. DESIGNATIONS CAN ALSO BE REVOKED IF THE SECRETARY DETERMINES THAT THERE ARE GROUNDS FOR DOING SO AND NOTIFIES CONGRESS. CONGRESS CAN ALSO PASS LEGISLATION TO REVOKE DESIGNATIONS.

15. (U) ORIGIN

(U) THE LAW RESPONDS TO CONCERNS ABOUT FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS RAISING FUNDS IN THE UNITED STATES.

(U) SOME TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS HAVE PORTRAYED THEMSELVES AS
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PAGE 08 STATE 184471 080145Z
RAISING MONEY FOR CHARITABLE ACTIVITIES SUCH AS CLINICS OR SCHOOLS. THESE ACTIVITIES HAVE HELPED RECRUIT SUPPORTERS AND ACTIVISTS AND HAVE SOMETIMES PROVIDED SUPPORT TO TERRORISTS.

(U) CONGRESS WAS QUITE AWARE THAT TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS MIGHT CLOAK THEIR ACTIVITIES WITH PROFESSIONS OF GOOD WORKS AND ADDRESSED THE MATTER AS FOLLOWS: "FOREIGN ORGANIZATIONS THAT ENGAGE IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY ARE SO TAINTED BY THEIR CRIMINAL CONDUCT THAT ANY CONTRIBUTION TO SUCH AN ORGANIZATION FACILITATES THAT CONDUCT. (SECTION 301 (A) (7))."

(U) THEREFORE, ANY CONTRIBUTION TO A FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, REGARDLESS OF THE INTENDED PURPOSE, IS PROHIBITED BY THE STATUTE, UNLESS THE CONTRIBUTION IS LIMITED TO MEDICINE OR RELIGIOUS MATERIALS.

16. (U) WASHINGTON ACTIVITIES

A) ON 1 OCTOBER 99 THE SECRETARY SENDS THE DESIGNATIONS TO THE CONGRESS AS A CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT.

B) ON 8 OCTOBER THE DESIGNATIONS ARE PUBLISHED IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER.

C) ON 8 OCTOBER A SENIOR DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL (IDENTITY

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PENDING) WILL ANNOUNCE THE DESIGNATIONS AND BRIEF AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT. (NOTE: DUE TO POSSIBLE SCHEDULING CONFLICTS, THE DATE FOR THE ANNOUNCEMENT AND BRIEFING MAY SLIP TO TUESDAY, 12 OCTOBER.)

- D) AFTER THE STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFING A SUITABLE OFFICIAL (PROBABLY COUNTERTERRORISM COORDINATOR AMBASSADOR MICHAEL SHEEHAN) WILL BRIEF AT PA'S
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 09 STATE 184471 080145Z
WASHINGTON FOREIGN PRESS CENTER.

17. (C) PUBLIC AFFAIRS/PUBLIC DIPLOMACY GOALS FOR THE ANNOUNCEMENT:

- A) DISCREDIT FTOS AND WEAKEN PUBLIC AND GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR THEM.
- B) DISCOURAGE FINANCIAL AND IN-KIND CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEM
- C) REEMPHASIZE U.S. GOVERNMENT COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY.

18. (U) MISSIONS ARE INVITED TO SUGGEST PUBLIC ACTIVITIES, SUCH AS BACKGROUNDEERS WITH INDIVIDUAL JOURNALISTS AND THE LIKE. PLEASE SEND SUGGESTIONS BY EMAIL TO S/CT SENIOR ADVISOR FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY DONALD R. HAMILTON. (202) 647-9390.

19. (U) INSTRUCTIONS TO INDIVIDUAL POSTS WILL FOLLOW BY SEPARATE MESSAGE.
ALBRIGHT UNQUOTE ALBRIGHT

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

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PTQ8523

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PAGE 01 AMMAN 05158 181613Z
ACTION SCT-00

INFO	LOG-00	MFA-01	NP-00	AID-00	A-00	CA-02	CCO-00
	CG-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00	CTME-00	INL-00	DODE-00
	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-00	FAAE-00
	FBIE-00	UTED-00	FBO-01	VC-00	TEDE-00	INR-00	INSE-00
	IO-00	LAB-01	L-00	MMP-00	M-00	AC-01	NEA-00
	DCP-01	NRCE-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	PA-00	PM-00
	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00	IRM-00	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00
	USIE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01	FMP-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01
	DRL-02	G-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/014W		

-----86968B 181616Z /38

O 181612Z SEP 00
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6285
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS AMMAN 005158

LONDON FOR SUTPHIN, PARIS FOR LEAF, ROME FOR QUESADA

USAID/ANE/MEA FOR FINAN AND ROJAS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, KPAL, KISL, JO
SUBJECT: SECURITY COURT CONVICTS UBL SUSPECTS OF PLOTTING

ATTACKS DURING THE MILLENNIUM.

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PAGE 02 AMMAN 05158 181613Z

1. (U) THE STATE SECURITY COURT ON SEPTEMBER 18 CONVICTED 22 SUSPECTED MEMBERS OF USAMA BIN LADEN'S "AL QAEDA" TERRORIST NETWORK OF PLANNING ATTACKS ON TOURIST SITES DURING THE MILLENNIUM. ACCORDING TO NEWS REPORTS, THE COURT SENTENCED EIGHT DEFENDANTS (FOUR OF WHOM REMAIN AT LARGE) TO DEATH, BUT LATER COMMUTED TWO OF THE SENTENCES TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT AT HARD LABOR. THOSE SENTENCED TO HANG INCLUDE REPUTED GROUP RINGLEADER, KHADER ABU HOSHAR. THE COURT SENTENCED 14 OTHER DEFENDANTS TO PRISON TERMS RANGING BETWEEN SEVEN-AND-A-HALF AND 15 YEARS AND ACQUITTED SIX MEN FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE. ALL OF THOSE WHO STOOD TRIAL ARE JORDANIANS OF PALESTINIAN ORIGIN, EXCEPT FOR ONE IRAQI NATIONAL, WHO WAS ACQUITTED, AND ONE ALGERIAN, WHO RECEIVED A SEVEN-AND-A-YEAR SENTENCE. THE VERDICTS WILL AUTOMATICALLY BE APPEALED TO THE COURT OF

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CASSATION. JORDAN HAS COMMUTED ALL PREVIOUS DEATH SENTENCES FOR CRIMES OF THIS NATURE.

2. (U) THE HEAD OF THE COURT'S THREE-MAN TRIBUNAL COL. TAYEL RAQAD SAID "THE COURT HAS NO DOUBT THAT THOSE SENTENCED TO DEATH HAD A DETERMINED WILL TO CARRY OUT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST AMERICAN AND ISRAELI INTERESTS IN JORDAN." ABU HOSHAH'S LAWYER, SALAH BADR, TERMED THE VERDICTS POLITICALLY-MOTIVATED. HE AND OTHER DEFENSE LAWYERS HAD ARGUED THAT THEIR CLIENTS HAD NO LINKS TO BIN LADEN AND ONLY WANTED TO "FIGHT JEWS" AND UPHOLD ISLAM. ACCORDING TO LAWYER JAWAD YOUNIS, THE CONVICTIONS WERE DESIGNED TO "SERVE THE AMERICANS AND TO PROVE THAT JORDAN IS PURSUING WHAT THEY CALL TERRORISTS." MUNIR MAQDAH, WHO WAS SENTENCED TO DEATH IN ABSENTIA, TOLD REPORTERS IN LEBANON THAT THE "RULING WAS MADE BY JORDAN TO SATISFY THE UNITED STATES AND THE SECURITY APPARATUS OF THE ZIONIST

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PAGE 03 AMMAN 05158 181613Z
STATE."

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

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PAGE 01 ISLAMA 03628 291215Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 SAS-00 /000W
-----FF3960 291215Z /38

O 291213Z JUN 01
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6995
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL DUBAI IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 003628

NODIS

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6 (X5) (X6)
TAGS: PTER, PREL, UNSC, PHUM, SNAR, AF, PK
SUBJ: TERRORISM: DEMARCHE ON THREAT BY AFGHAN-
BASED TERRORISTS

REF: (A) STATE 111711
(B) STATE 112067
(C) STATE 112058 (NOTAL)

(U) CLASSIFIED AMBASSADOR WILLIAM B. MILAM.
REASONS: 1.5 (B) (C) (D), 1.6 (X5).

1. (S) AMBASSADOR DELIVERED REF (A) DEMARCHE TO
TALIBAN "AMBASSADOR" ABDUL SALAM ZAEFF AT 1100
LOCAL ON JUNE 29. EMPHASIZING THE SERIOUSNESS OF
SECRET

PAGE 02 ISLAMA 03628 291215Z
THE MESSAGE, THE AMBASSADOR WALKED ZAEFF THROUGH
REF (A) POINTS, PAUSING AFTER EACH ONE TO ENSURE
THAT THE TALIBAN NOTETAKER UNDERSTOOD. ZAEFF
LISTENED CAREFULLY AND PROMISED TO CONVEY THE
AMBASSADOR'S REMARKS THAT SAME DAY. HE EXPECTED
TO RECEIVE A RESPONSE WITHIN TWO OR THREE DAYS,
BUT ADDED THAT THE TALIBAN DO NOT SEE AMERICANS
AS THEIR ENEMIES AND THAT THERE ARE NO THREATS TO
AMERICANS COMING FROM THE TALIBAN. NONETHELESS,
SAID ZAEFF, "WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO FOLLOW UP AND
STOP" ANY THREAT.

2. (C) THE AMBASSADOR ALSO TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THE
MEETING TO DELIVER THE DEPARTMENT'S REF (C)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN S BLODGETT
DATE/CASE ID: 23 OCT 2006 200602966

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RESPONSE TO THE TALIBAN'S PROPOSAL TO SEND A HIGH-LEVEL NARCOTICS DELEGATION TO THE UNITED STATES. IN ADDITION, THE AMBASSADOR TOLD ZAEFF (AS PER DEPT INSTRUCTIONS) THAT THE TALIBAN'S REQUEST TO SEND TWO "DIPLOMATS" TO THEIR NEW YORK "OFFICE" REMAINS UNDER CONSIDERATION, BUT THAT ONE MAJOR PROBLEM IS THAT THAT OFFICE IS IN FACT CLOSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNSCR 1333. FINALLY, THE AMBASSADOR RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE JULY 15 DEADLINE FOR UNSMA TO FIND A NEW OFFICE IN KABUL, NOTING THAT HE HOPED IT WAS NOT INDICATIVE OF A TALIBAN DESIRE TO KICK THE UN OUT OF AFGHANISTAN AND THAT HE HOPED THE PROPERTY DISPUTE COULD BE RESOLVED WITHOUT UNSMA'S HAVING TO LEAVE. ZAEFF IMMEDIATELY RESPONDED THAT THE TALIBAN DO NOT INTEND TO FORCE THE UN TO LEAVE AFGHANISTAN AND PROMISED TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF THE UNSMA OFFICE

SECRET

PAGE 03 ISLAMA 03628 291215Z
WITH THE APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES IN KABUL.

3. (C) ON UBL, ZAEFF EMPHASIZED THAT THE TALIBAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH UBL AND OTHERS IS BASED NOT ON ENMITY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, BUT ON "CULTURE." ON AID, ZAEFF PRAISED THE US ASSISTANCE BUT WORRIED THAT ONLY A SMALL PORTION OF THE AID ACTUALLY REACHES THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. THE AMBASSADOR REASSURED HIM THAT SUCH FEARS WERE ABSOLUTELY UNFOUNDED BUT STATED THAT, IF ZAEFF HAD ANY DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY, WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO LOOK INTO IT. ZAEFF ALSO COMMENTED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER IF THE US WERE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF US AID, RATHER THAN GOING THROUGH A THIRD PARTY. THE AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT, ALTHOUGH WE DO PLAN FOR THE NARCOTICS-RELATED AID TO GO DIRECTLY TO THE FARMERS, THERE IS "NO WAY" AMERICANS COULD BE IN AFGHANISTAN TO DISBURSE THE AID AS LONG AS AFGHANISTAN CONTINUES TO BE A SAFEHAVEN FOR TERRORISTS AND OTHERS HOSTILE TO AMERICANS. "THERE IS NO DANGER TO A SINGLE AMERICAN IN AFGHANISTAN," SAID ZAEFF. "WE SHALL HOLD YOU TO YOUR WORD," CONCLUDED THE AMBASSADOR.

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

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RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(D)

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PAGE 01 NAIROB 07020 211350Z
ACTION SCT-00

INFO	LOG-00	AF-01	A-00	CA-02	CCO-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	OASY-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EUR-01	FAAE-00
	FBIE-00	TEDE-00	INR-00	LAB-01	L-01	ADS-00	M-00
	NEA-01	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OCS-03	PM-00	P-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	USSS-00	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00
	PRMC-01	DRL-09	G-00	/021W			

-----3B79A6 211350Z /38

O 211351Z MAY 96
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8992
INFO AMEMBASSY ASMARA
AMCONSUL JEDDAH
AMEMBASSY RIYADH
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY LONDON

S E C R E T NAIROBI 007020

NOFORN
FROM EMBASSY KHARTOUM OFFICE
FOR NSC SUSAN RICE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/06
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PINS, PINR, SU
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 NAIROB 07020 211350Z
SUBJECT: SUDAN: FOREIGN MINISTER ON DEVELOPMENTS RE:

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, L. R. LOHMAN, DAS, A/ISS
REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN S BLODGETT
CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 25X6
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 21 MAY 2031
DATE/CASE ID: 23 OCT 2006 200602966

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TERRORISM AND PEACE

REF: NAIROBI 6573

1. CLASSIFIED BY TIMOTHY CARNEY, AMBASSADOR TO SUDAN.
REASONS 1.5(D).

2. (SBU) THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE SEE PARAGRAH 4.

3. (S) FOLLOWING ON OUR 11 MAY KHARTOUM MEETING (REF)
FOREIGN MINISTER TAHA HAS FAXED ME CONVEYING
DEVELOPMENTS ON U.S. TERRORISM CONCERNS, AND ON STEPS
TO SOLVE THE CIVIL WAR. HE CITES THE DEPARTURE FROM
SUDAN OF USAMA BIN LADEN, AND OF EGYPTIAN ELEMENTS, AND
ASKS FOR "POSITIVE" U.S. RESPONSE. THE ESSENCE OF HIS
MESSAGE IS:

BEGIN TEXT:

... I AM PLEASED TO CONVEY TO YOU THE FOLLOWING:

(1) AS FAR AS PEACE IS CONCERNED, A SYMPOSIUM ON THE
CULTURE OF PEACE IS TAKING PLACE NOW IN AMSTERDAM UNDER
THE AUSPICES OF UNESCO. A DELEGATION OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE SUDAN, LED BY DR. GHAZI SALAHUAL(SIC) DIN IS
PARTICIPATING IN THIS SYMPOSIUM AS WELL AS A DELEGATION
OF THE GARANG FACTION. WE HOPE THIS WILL BE A STEP
FORWARD IN THE PATH OF PEACE.

(2) REGARDING THE ARAB AFGHANS, AS I TOLD YOU,
EGYPTIAN ELEMENTS HAVE ALREADY LEFT AND NOW I WOULD

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SECRET

PAGE 03 NAIROB 07020 211350Z
LIKE TO INFORM YOU THAT USAMA BIN LADIN HAS FINALLY
LEFT THE COUNTRY...
END TEXT

4. (S/NOFORN) WHILE WE HAVE LITTLE IN THE WAY OF
VERIFIABLE CONFIRMATION OF THIS, I BELIEVE WE MIGHT
USEFULLY TAKE TAHA AT HIS WORD. I PROPOSE TO GO BACK
TO HIM BY FAX AND ASK IF WE CAN CITE KHARTOUM
ASSURANCES THAT USAMA BIN LADEN HAS LEFT, AND WILL NOT
BE PERMITTED TO OPERATE FROM THE SUDAN IN THE FUTURE

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AS PART OF A DEPARTMENT OF STATE STATEMENT WELCOMING
PROGRESS IN OUR DIALOGUE ON TERRORISM. SUBJECT TO
CAIRO [REDACTED] INFORMATION, WE MIGHT ALSO ADD IN A NOTE
ABOUT ASSURANCES OF A DEPARTURE FROM SUDAN OF
UNSPECIFIED NUMBERS OF EGYPTIAN TERRORIST ELEMENTS AS
WELL. OUR STATEMENT MIGHT WELL ADD THAT VERIFIABLE
INFORMATION ON SUCH DEPARTURES IS ULTIMATELY ESSENTIAL.

B1

5. (U) ASMARA MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

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SECRET

PT00210

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 ISLAMA 07665 01 OF 04 121147Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 SAS-00 /000W
-----74C46C 121148Z /38

O 121146Z OCT 98
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0781
INFO AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 007665

NODIS

DECAPTIONED

DEPT FOR P, SA, S/CT, AND SA/PAB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/08
TAGS: PREL, PTER, KISL, AF, SA
SUBJ: USAMA BIN LADIN: HIGH-LEVEL TALIBAN OFFICIAL GIVES THE
STANDARD LINE ON BIN LADIN WITH A COUPLE OF NUANCES, IN OCTOBER 11
MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR

REFS: (A) ISLAMABAD 7620
- (B) ISLAMABAD 7553
- (C) STATE 183868
- (D) STATE 181837 (ALL NOTAL)

(U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR WILLIAM B. MILAM
SECRET

PAGE 02 ISLAMA 07665 01 OF 04 121147Z
REASONS: 1.5 (C) (D).

1. (S) SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR MILAM MET OCTOBER 11 WITH MAULAWI WAKIL AHMED, A CLOSE ASSISTANT TO TALIBAN LEADER MULLAH OMAR. THE MEETING FOCUSSED LARGELY ON TERRORIST USAMA BIN LADIN AND WHAT THE TALIBAN PLANNED TO DO ABOUT HIM. OTHER ISSUES LIKE COUNTERNARCOTICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS WERE TOUCHED ON. THE AMBASSADOR STRESSED THAT BIN LADIN HAD TO BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE AND THE TALIBAN SHOULD EXPEL HIM SO THIS COULD HAPPEN. THE AMBASSADOR UNDERScoreD THAT THE TALIBAN HAD TO DO THIS IN THE VERY NEAR-TERM. IN HIS INITIAL COMMENTS IN RESPONSE, WAKIL MADE STANDARD TALIBAN POINTS, STRESSING THE SPECIOUS POINT THAT THE AFGHAN PEOPLE WOULD OVERTHROW THE TALIBAN IF BIN LADIN WAS EXPELLED. WAKIL ALSO REVIEWED TWO TALIBAN PROPOSALS THAT THEY MADE TO THE SAUDI ARABIAN

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN S BLODGETT
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 12 OCT 2018
DATE/CASE ID: 23 OCT 2006 200602966

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GOVERNMENT (SAG) INVOLVING WAYS TO BRING BIN LADIN TO TRIAL.

2. (S) SUMMARY (CONTINUED): AFTER THE AMBASSADOR REITERATED THE U.S. STANCE ON BIN LADIN, WAKIL TOOK A NEW TACK, ADDING SOME NEW NUANCES TO THE TALIBAN POSITION HE HAD REVIEWED EARLIER. FOR EXAMPLE, HE STRESSED THAT THE TALIBAN SEE BIN LADIN AS "A SERIOUS PROBLEM." HE ALSO ASKED SOME QUESTIONS AS TO HOW BIN LADIN WOULD BE TREATED SHOULD HE BE EXPELLED TO SAUDI ARABIA. BASED ON WAKIL'S COMMENTS, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE TALIBAN ARE WRESTLING WITH THE BIN LADIN ISSUE AND THAT THEIR HERETOFORE HARD-LINE STANCE ON THIS ISSUE MAY BE IN SOME SORT OF FLUX. END SUMMARY.

MEETING WITH WAKIL

3. (S) THE AMBASSADOR MET OCTOBER 11 WITH TALIBAN LEADER MULLAH
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PAGE 03 ISLAMA 07665 01 OF 04 121147Z
OMAR'S CLOSE ASSISTANT MAULAWI WAKIL AHMED, WHO WAS IN ISLAMABAD FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH UN SPECIAL ENVOY BRAHIMI. SYED RAHMAN HAQQANI, CHARGE OF THE TALIBAN-CONTROLLED AFGHAN EMBASSY, AND POLOFF (NOTETAKER) SAT IN ON THE MEETING. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THE U.S. FULLY SUPPORTED THE BRAHIMI MISSION AND DID NOT IN ANY WAY WANT TO INTERRUPT BRAHIMI'S TALKS. (NOTE: BRAHIMI ARRIVED IN PAKISTAN ON OCTOBER 8 FOR MEETINGS WITH THE GOP AND THE TALIBAN -- SEE REF A.) HOWEVER, IT WAS GOOD THAT THE TALIBAN HAD SPACE IN THEIR SCHEDULE FOR THIS FACE-TO-FACE MEETING. WAKIL NODDED ASSENT, COMMENTING THAT HE HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE U.S. THROUGH PHONE CALLS AND BY FAX. NOTING PRIOR CONTACTS WITH AMBASSADORS RICHARDSON AND SIMONS, AND DCM ALAN EASTHAM, THE AMBASSADOR TOLD WAKIL THE U.S. WANTS TO CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE WITH THE TALIBAN. THE DIALOGUE IS IMPORTANT TO ENSURE THAT BOTH SIDES UNDERSTANDS THE OTHER'S VIEWS. THE U.S GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT THE U.S. EMBASSY IN ISLAMABAD IS BEST PLACED FOR THESE CONTACTS, HE ADDED.

MAKING U.S. POINTS ON BIN LADIN

4. (S) CONTINUING, THE AMBASSADOR NOTED THAT THE U.S. HAS A NUMBER OF ITEMS IT WANTED TO RAISE IN THE MEETING. MANY OF THESE POINTS HAVE BEEN RAISED IN PREVIOUS CONTACTS. THE AMBASSADOR UNDERScored, HOWEVER, THAT AT THIS POINT, THE PRIMARY ISSUE FOR THE U.S. IS TERRORISM. DRAWING ON REF D POINTS, THE AMBASSADOR STATED THAT THE TALIBAN MUST UNDERSTAND THAT A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF BIN LADIN IS CRITICAL. THE U.S. REMAINED EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN OF THIS TERRORIST CRIMINAL AND OTHER TERRORISTS ASSOCIATED WITH HIS NETWORK. BIN LADIN HAS DECLARED WAR

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ON THE U.S.; NOT ONLY THAT, BUT HE HAS TAKEN ACTION ON THESE VIEWS.
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PAGE 04 ISLAMA 07665 01 OF 04 121147Z
THERE IS CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF HIS KEY ROLE IN MASTERMINDING THE
CRIMES THAT TOOK PLACE IN AUGUST IN EAST AFRICA. BIN LADIN HAS
ALSO BEEN CONNECTED TO MANY, MANY OTHER CRIMES. BECAUSE OF HIS
CRIMINAL ACTS, MANY LIVES HAVE BEEN TAKEN, INCLUDING AMERICAN AND
MUSLIM. IT IS THE U.S. VIEW THAT THE LONGER BIN LADIN STAYS IN
AFGHANISTAN, THE MORE THE TALIBAN WILL BECOME ASSOCIATED WITH HIS
CRIMES BECAUSE THEY ARE GIVING HIM REFUGE THERE. THE U.S. WOULD
LIKE VERY MUCH TO HAVE A CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE TALIBAN
AND AFGHANISTAN AS A WHOLE. HOWEVER, THE ISSUE OF BIN LADIN MUST
BE SOLVED. IT IS NOT A MATTER OF MONTHS OR WEEKS, BUT OF DAYS.
THE TALIBAN MUST EXPEL BIN LADIN SO THAT HE CAN BE BROUGHT TO
JUSTICE.

WAKIL MAKES THE STANDARD TALIBAN POINTS...

5. (S) AMBASSADOR MILAM COVERED OTHER TOPICS OF CONTENTION WITH
THE TALIBAN, INCLUDING HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THEIR POLICIES REGARDING

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

SECRET

PTQ0732

PAGE 01 ISLAMA 07665 02 OF 04 121148Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 SAS-00 /000W
-----74C472 121148Z /38

O 121146Z OCT 98
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0782
INFO AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 007665

NODIS

DEPT FOR P, SA, S/CT, AND SA/PAB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/08
TAGS: PREL, PTER, KISL, AF, SA

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJ: USAMA BIN LADIN: HIGH-LEVEL TALIBAN OFFICIAL GIVES THE STANDARD LINE ON BIN LADIN WITH A COUPLE OF NUANCES, IN OCTOBER 11 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR

WOMEN AND GIRLS. HE MENTIONED PROMINENTLY THE ISSUE OF INCLUSION OF ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN ANY NEW AFGHAN GOVERNMENT. HE STRESSED THAT THE U.S. BELIEVED THAT TRUE PEACE AND STABILITY WILL COME TO AFGHANISTAN UNDER AN INCLUSIVE GOVERNMENT THAT PROTECTS AND RESPECTS THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES. (NOTE: SEE PARAS 13-4.)

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PAGE 02 ISLAMA 07665 02 OF 04 121148Z

6. (S) WAKIL HAD BEEN LISTENING INTENTLY, WHILE HAQQANI TOOK CAREFUL NOTES OF THE AMBASSADOR'S COMMENTS. WAKIL REPLIED THAT THE TALIBAN HAS MANY PROBLEMS WITH IRAN, SAUDI ARABIA, ETC. THEY DO NOT WANT THESE PROBLEMS OR THE CONFLICTS INVOLVED. THE TALIBAN WANT TO SEE ISSUES RESOLVED, BUT THE TALIBAN ARE COMING TO THE VIEW THAT MAYBE CONFLICT HAS TO BE MET BY CONFLICT (EVIDENTLY REPLYING TO THE POINT ABOUT FORMING AN INCLUSIVE GOVERNMENT). THE TALIBAN AGREE WITH THE U.S. ON SOME ISSUES, BUT THE TALIBAN AND THE U.S. HOLD SOME POSITIONS THAT ARE CONTRADICTORY. WHILE THE TALIBAN UNDERSTAND THAT BIN LADIN IS IMPORTANT FOR THE U.S., HE IS ONE OF THE ISSUES ON WHICH THERE ARE PROBLEMS. THE TALIBAN DO NOT SUPPORT TERRORISM. WAKIL THEN LAUNCHED INTO A BRIEF REVIEW OF BIN LADIN'S INVOLVEMENT WITH AFGHANISTAN. HE RELATED THAT BIN LADIN WAS INVITED TO AFGHANISTAN BY THE PREVIOUS REGIME, NOT THE TALIBAN. (NOTE: BIN LADIN CAME TO AFGHANISTAN IN MID-1996, SETTLING IN AN AREA CONTROLLED BY THE BURHANUDDIN RABBANI REGIME.) WHEN THE TALIBAN CAPTURED (IN SEPTEMBER 1996) THE AREA WHERE BIN LADIN WAS BASED (IN NANGARHAR PROVINCE), THE TALIBAN CONTACTED SAUDI ARABIA. SAUDI ARABIA TOLD US TO "KEEP HIM THERE." SUBSEQUENTLY, THE TALIBAN (IN EARLY 1997) MOVED BIN LADIN TO KANDAHAR TO KEEP A BETTER WATCH ON HIM. BIN LADIN WENT ON TO BREAK TALIBAN RULES BY SPEAKING TO THE PRESS. THE SAUDIS THEN PRESSED THE TALIBAN TO EXTRADITE HIM. THE AMIR AL-MUMINEEN ("COMMANDER OF THE FAITHFUL"-- MULLAH OMAR'S OFFICIAL TITLE) TOLD THE SAUDIS THAT THE TALIBAN WOULD CONTROL HIM. BIN LADIN WAS UPSET AT THE TALIBAN'S EFFORTS TO CONTROL HIM. HE TOLD THE TALIBAN HE WOULD LEAVE AFGHANISTAN, BUT BIN LADIN WAS UNABLE TO FIND SOMEWHERE TO GO.

7. (S) WAKIL SAID THE TALIBAN TOOK SERIOUSLY SAUDI AND U.S. DEMANDS TO EXPEL BIN LADIN. HOWEVER, IT WAS NOT SO EASY FOR THE

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TALIBAN TO EXPEL HIM. BIN LADIN WAS ADMIRER BY THE AFGHAN PEOPLE FOR HIS SUPPORT FOR THE RESISTANCE DURING THE JIHAD (ISLAMIC HOLY WAR) AGAINST THE SOVIETS. THERE WAS ALSO A CULTURAL AND ISLAMIC

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TRADITION OF GRANTING SANCTUARY TO THOSE WHO ASKED FOR IT. EVEN JEWS HAD BEEN GRANTED SUCH SANCTUARY IN AFGHANISTAN DURING WORLD WAR II. IF THE TALIBAN THROW HIM OUT, THE PEOPLE OF AFGHANISTAN WILL BECOME VERY ANGRY AND THEY WILL OVERTHROW THE TALIBAN. THE PEOPLE WILL ACCUSE THEM OF TAKING U.S. OR SAUDI MONEY IF BIN LADIN IS EXTRADITED. THE U.S. MISSILE STRIKES (ON AUGUST 20 ON THE KHOST TERRORIST CAMPS) FURTHER ALIENATED THE AFGHAN PEOPLE FROM THE U.S. NONETHELESS, EVEN IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE U.S. STRIKES, THE AMIR (MULLAH OMAR) TOLD BIN LADIN THAT THERE WAS NOT TWO GOVERNMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND THAT THE TALIBAN WOULD DEAL WITH THE U.S. THE TALIBAN DO NOT BELIEVE THAT BIN LADIN WAS INVOLVED IN THE EAST AFRICA BOMBINGS. BIN LADIN HAS ASSURED THEM OF THIS. IN ANY CASE, THE TALIBAN WANT U.S. TROOPS WITHDRAWN FROM THE GULF REGION. EVEN IF BIN LADIN WERE TO DIE, MANY MUSLIMS WOULD REMAIN CONCERNED THAT U.S. TROOPS WERE PRESENT IN THAT AREA.

8. (S) TURNING TO RECENT SAUDI GOVERNMENT EFFORTS REGARDING BIN LADIN, WAKIL RELATED THAT

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NONETHELESS, THE TALIBAN WANT GOOD RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA, AND CONCERNING BIN LADIN, THE TALIBAN HAD RECENTLY MADE TWO PROPOSALS TO THE SAUDIS. (NOTE: A GOP OFFICIAL REVIEWED THESE PROPOSALS IN AN OCTOBER 7 MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR -- SEE REF B.) BOTH OF THESE PROPOSALS WOULD PROVIDE SECRET

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"RELIGIOUS REASONS" TO THE AFGHAN PEOPLE ON HOW THE TALIBAN WERE HANDLING THE BIN LADIN ISSUE. THE FIRST PROPOSAL INVOLVED THE FORMATION OF A JOINT SAUDI/AFGHAN GROUP OF ULEMA (RELIGIOUS SCHOLARS) THAT WOULD LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE OF BIN LADIN'S INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM. THE SECOND PROPOSAL WOULD ALLOW FAMILY MEMBERS OF ANY SAUDIS KILLED IN THE KHOBAR TOWERS EXPLOSION TO BRING THEIR CASES TO AN AFGHAN COURT.

9. (S) CONCLUDING HIS INITIAL COMMENTS ON BIN LADIN, WAKIL REPEATED WHAT HE SAID WAS A PASHTU PHRASE SAYING THAT "ON ONE SIDE WE HAVE A ROCK AND ON THE OTHER THERE IS A TIGER." THE BIN LADIN ISSUE, HE SAID, CAN BE DEALT WITH.

BIN LADIN IS NOW VERY SCARED, HE ADDED.

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 SAS-00 /000W
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O 121146Z OCT 98
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0783
INFO AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 007665

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DEPT FOR P, SA, S/CT, AND SA/PAB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/08
TAGS: PREL, PTER, KISL, AF, SA
SUBJ: USAMA BIN LADIN: HIGH-LEVEL TALIBAN OFFICIAL GIVES THE
STANDARD LINE ON BIN LADIN WITH A COUPLE OF NUANCES, IN OCTOBER 11
MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR

WITH SOME NUANCES

10. (S) THE AMBASSADOR

HE COMMENTED THAT IT WAS

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IMPORTANT FOR THE TALIBAN TO RECOGNIZE THAT BIN LADIN WAS A
CRIMINAL AND INVOLVED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES NO MATTER WHAT HE HAD
DONE IN THE PAST. THE TALIBAN MAY BELIEVE HE IS UNDER CONSTRAINTS
NOW, BUT HE IS NOT. HE IS ACTIVE. HIS NETWORK IS OPERATING. THE
AMBASSADOR OBSERVED THAT WAKIL'S MENTION OF THE TALIBAN'S PURPORTED
PROBLEM WITH THE AFGHAN PEOPLE CONCERNING BIN LADIN WAS REALLY NOT
A PROBLEM AT ALL: ALL THE TALIBAN HAD TO DO WAS TO TELL THE PEOPLE
THAT THEY WERE EXPELLING BIN LADIN BECAUSE HE WAS A TERRORIST
CRIMINAL. THAT WOULD CONVINCE THE PEOPLE IF THEY ARE REALLY SO
CONCERNED. AS FOR WAKIL'S REFERENCE TO JEWS TAKING SHELTER IN

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AFGHANISTAN (SEE PARA SEVEN), HE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THE NAZI GERMANS WERE KILLING JEWS IN EUROPE WHO HAD NO CHANCE TO DEFEND THEMSELVES. THE SITUATION WITH BIN LADIN IS EXACTLY THE OPPOSITE: HE IS THE ONE DOING THE RANDOM KILLING. THE AMBASSADOR URGED WAKIL TO SPEAK TO HIS LEADERSHIP ON THE MATTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE TALIBAN MUST MOVE QUICKLY ON BIN LADIN.

11. (S) IN RESPONSE TO THE AMBASSADOR, WAKIL THEN MADE SOME INTERESTING COMMENTS THAT APPEARED TO ADD SOME NUANCES TO THE STANDARD TALIBAN POSITION ON BIN LADIN THAT HE HAD REPEATED EARLIER IN THE CONVERSATION. THIS SEQUENCE IN THE CONVERSATION BEGAN WITH WAKIL ASKING THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: "FOR MY PERSONAL INFORMATION, I WANT TO ASK IF THE TALIBAN HAND OVER BIN LADIN TO SAUDI ARABIA WOULD HE THEN BE SENT TO THE U.S.?" THE AMBASSADOR REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT THINK SO, BUT WOULD HAVE TO ASK HIS AUTHORITIES FOR INFORMATION ON THIS. WAKIL THEN ASKED: "WOULD HE (BIN LADIN) BE TREATED LIKE DR. NAJIB OR ABDUR RAHMAN IF HE WAS BROUGHT TO SAUDI ARABIA?" (NOTE: NAJIB WAS THE COMMUNIST-ERA LEADER THE TALIBAN SUMMARILY EXECUTED WHEN THEY ENTERED KABUL IN SEPTEMBER 1996; ABDUR RAHMAN IS THE EGYPTIAN CONVICTED FOR PLANNING THE WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING.) THE AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT THE BETTER MODEL

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FOR THE TALIBAN TO CONSIDER HERE WAS WHAT HAPPENED TO ABDUR RAHMAN. THE AMBASSADOR ASKED THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: "WOULD IT MAKE A DIFFERENCE WHETHER BIN LADIN WAS SENT TO SAUDI ARABIA OR THE U.S.?" WAKIL REPLIED THAT HE SAW DIFFICULTIES IN BOTH VENUES. THAT IS WHY THE TALIBAN'S TWO PROPOSALS TO SAUDI ARABIA ON THE MATTER SHOULD BE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED. WAKIL THEN ASKED ABOUT PROOF OF BIN LADIN'S INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORIST ACTS. THE AMBASSADOR REPLIED THAT THERE WERE LARGE AMOUNTS OF PROOF; EVEN THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT HAD PROOF OF HIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE EAST AFRICA BOMBINGS. WAKIL OBSERVED THAT BECAUSE PAKISTAN DOES NOT HAVE SHARI'A (ISLAMIC) LAW, ANY TRIAL OF BIN LADIN COULD NOT BE HELD THERE. SUCH A TRIAL COULD TAKE PLACE IN SAUDI ARABIA BECAUSE -- LIKE AFGHANISTAN -- IT WAS RULED BY THE SHARI'A. WAKIL THEN ASKED "WHY DO YOU THINK WE CONTINUE TO HOLD BIN LADIN AND NOT SURRENDER HIM TO THE U.S. OR SAUDI ARABIA?" THE AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT WE TOOK THE TALIBAN AT THEIR WORD THAT THEY WERE ACTING OUT OF THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF AFGHAN CULTURE AND THE RESPECT BIN LADIN ENGENDERED BECAUSE OF HIS ROLE IN THE RESISTANCE.

12. (S) CLOSING THIS PART OF THE CONVERSATION, WAKIL ADMITTED THAT BIN LADIN IS "A SERIOUS PROBLEM" FOR THE TALIBAN. THE TALIBAN WANT TO SEE THE MATTER SOLVED, HE REITERATED. WAKIL SAID HE HAD HEARD THAT THE U.S. WAS CONSIDERING ANOTHER MISSILE STRIKE. THIS ANNOYED THE TALIBAN. WAKIL RELATED THAT HE WONDERED WHETHER HIS OWN HOME WAS BEING TARGETED.

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OTHER ISSUES

13. (S) THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE MEETING DEALT WITH THE BIN LADIN
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ISSUE. HOWEVER, OTHER ISSUES WERE BRIEFLY TOUCHED ON. THE
AMBASSADOR UNDERSCORED DEEP U.S. RESPECT FOR THE SACRIFICES
INCURRED BY THE AFGHANS DURING THE WAR AGAINST THE SOVIETS. HE
SAID THE U.S. WANTED TO SEE THE TALIBAN WORK CLOSELY WITH THE
BRAHIMI MISSION AND TO FULLY ACCEPT "THE POINTS OF COMMON
UNDERSTANDING" WORKED OUT BY THE "SIX-PLUS-TWO" GROUP OF COUNTRIES.
IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT TO CALM THE SITUATION DOWN WITH IRAN. THE
U.S. DID NOT WANT TO SEE THE REGION DESTABILIZED BY FIGHTING
BETWEEN THE IRANIANS AND THE TALIBAN. THE U.S. HAD PUBLICLY
ANNOUNCED OUR SUPPORT FOR THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF AFGHANISTAN.
IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT TO WORK WITH BRAHIMI ON THE ISSUE OF FORMING
A BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT. THERE WAS LITTLE CHANCE THE WAR WOULD
END IF SUCH A GOVERNMENT WAS NOT FORMED, DESPITE TALIBAN EFFORTS TO
IMPOSE A SOLUTION BY MILITARY FORCE. THE AMBASSADOR ALSO MENTIONED
U.S. COUNTERNARCOTICS CONCERNS AS WELL AS U.S. CONCERNS ABOUT
TALIBAN RULES SEVERELY HINDERING WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT AND GIRLS'
EDUCATION.

14. (S) IN DISCUSSING THESE ISSUES, WAKIL DID NOT DEVIATE FROM

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PAGE 01 ISLAMA 07665 04 OF 04 121149Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 SAS-00 /000W
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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0784
INFO AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO

S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 04 ISLAMABAD 007665

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DEPT FOR P, SA, S/CT, AND SA/PAB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/08

TAGS: PREL, PTER, KISL, AF, SA

SUBJ: USAMA BIN LADIN: HIGH-LEVEL TALIBAN OFFICIAL GIVES THE
STANDARD LINE ON BIN LADIN WITH A COUPLE OF NUANCES, IN OCTOBER 11
MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR

STANDARD TALIBAN TALKING POINTS. IN A REFERENCE TO THE
"RECOGNITION" ISSUE, HE CLAIMED THAT THE TALIBAN SHOULD BE TREATED
AS A GOVERNMENT, NOT A MOVEMENT. HE STRESSED AFGHAN APPRECIATION
FOR U.S. SUPPORT DURING THE RESISTANCE. HE ALLOWED THAT THE
PROBLEM WITH IRAN SHOULD BE SOLVED, BUT HE SPENT AN EQUAL AMOUNT OF
TIME CRITICIZING IRAN'S AND RUSSIA'S SUPPORT FOR THE ANTI-TALIBAN
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OPPOSITION. HE ASSERTED THAT THE TALIBAN HAD BROUGHT PEACE AND
SECURITY TO AFGHANISTAN, AND HAD THE PEOPLE'S SUPPORT.
NEGOTIATIONS COULD NOT BE HELD WITH THE OTHER "CORRUPT" PARTIES.
THOSE PARTIES HAD HAD THEIR CHANCE TO RULE AFGHANISTAN AND FAILED.
IN ADDITION, THE TALIBAN THEMSELVES WERE MULTI-ETHNIC, SO A BROAD-
BASED GOVERNMENT WAS ALREADY IN PLACE. THE TALIBAN WANTED TO GET
RID OF NARCOTICS, BUT COULD NOT DO UNTIL THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY PROVIDED THEM ASSISTANCE TO DO SO. ON WOMEN'S ISSUES,
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAD TO UNDERSTAND THAT AFGHANISTAN HAD
ITS OWN ISLAMIC CUSTOMS. THERE WOULD BE SOME CHANGES IN THE FUTURE
ONCE THE WAR ENDED, BUT REGARDING WOMEN, THE TALIBAN WOULD STILL
HAVE TO ENFORCE THE SHARI'A, WHICH SERVED "TO PROTECT" WOMEN.

COMMENT

15. (S) THE ENTIRE MEETING WAS CONDUCTED IN A CORDIAL ATMOSPHERE.
HOWEVER, THE MOOD OF BOTH SIDES WAS VERY SERIOUS AND WAKIL THANKED
THE AMBASSADOR FOR HIS FRANK COMMENTS. BASICALLY, WAKIL STUCK TO
STANDARD TALIBAN POINTS ON BIN LADIN, INCLUDING THE CANARD THAT THE
TALIBAN CANNOT EXPEL HIM BECAUSE "THE PEOPLE" WILL BE ANGERED. HE
ALSO STRESSED TWO PROPOSALS ON HOW TO HANDLE THE BIN LADIN MATTER
THAT THE GOP HAS ALREADY MENTIONED TO US.

16. (S) COMMENT (CONTINUED): THAT SAID, SOME OF THE THREADS OF
WAKIL'S COMMENTS APPEARED NEW TO US. FOR EXAMPLE, HE MADE A POINT
OF NOTING THAT HE CONSIDERED BIN LADIN "A SERIOUS PROBLEM." HE
ALSO APPEARED TO BE SHOPPING AROUND FOR ASSURANCES FROM THE U.S.
AND THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT THAT BIN LADIN WOULD BE HANDLED IN A
CERTAIN WAY IF HE WAS EXPELLED TO SAUDI ARABIA: WOULD HE BE SENT

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ON TO THE U.S.??; WOULD HE BE TREATED LIKE DR. NAJIB? BY ASKING SUCH QUESTIONS, WAKIL SEEMED TO BE OPEN TO AT LEAST THE THEORETICAL POSSIBILITY THAT BIN LADIN COULD BE EXPELLED FROM AFGHANISTAN TO SAUDI ARABIA, AT LEAST. IT IS LESS CLEAR WHETHER HE GRASPED THE U.S. POINT THAT THIS ISSUE MUST BE HANDLED EXPEDITIOUSLY, ALTHOUGH WE REITERATED THAT KEY POINT SEVERAL TIMES. HOWEVER, WHEN WAKIL MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION, HE SEEMED TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE U.S. IS TAKING THIS ISSUE VERY, VERY SERIOUSLY.

17. (S) COMMENT (CONTINUED): AS WE REFLECT ON THE MEETING, OUR FIRST WITH A MAJOR TALIBAN LEADER SINCE BEFORE AUGUST 20, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE TALIBAN ARE TRYING TO WRESTLE WITH THE BIN LADIN MATTER. ON THE ONE HAND, THEY RISK ALIENATING THEIR EXTREMIST ALLIES -- ARAB, PAKISTANI, AND AFGHAN -- IF THEY GIVE HIM UP. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY WILL FACE THE INFLUENCE AND POWER OF THE U.S. AND SAUDI ARABIA IF THEY DO NOT. IT IS POSSIBLE WAKIL WAS TRYING TO INDICATE A MODICUM OF TALIBAN FLEXIBILITY ON THIS ISSUE. OUR CONCLUSION IS THAT NOW IS THE TIME TO NOTCH UP THE DIPLOMATIC RPT DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE, OUR OWN, THE SAUDIS, PAKISTAN, WHOMEVER ELSE HAS INFLUENCE AND THE ATTENTION OF THE TALIBAN. A POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION TO BIN LADIN'S EXPULSION FROM AFGHANISTAN MAY BE A MITE MORE POSSIBLE NOW. END COMMENT.
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ACTION SCT-00

INFO	LOG-00	A-00	CA-02	CCO-00	SMEC-00	DOEE-00	DS-00
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	OCS-03	PM-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	USSS-00
	SA-01	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/016W		

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R 160757Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6665
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
CIA WASHDC
NSC WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
USDOC WASHDC 0953
GCC COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 000475

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP; LONDON FOR SUTPHIN; PARIS FOR LEAF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/09
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, ASEC, SA

SECRET

PAGE 02 RIYADH 00475 01 OF 03 160833Z
SUBJECT: THE SAUDI BINLADIN GROUP: BUILDERS TO THE KING

CLASSIFIED BY DCM ALBERT THIBAUT, REASONS 1.5 (B&D).

SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION

1. (C) BEFORE THE NAME OF USAMA BIN LADIN BECAME NOTORIOUS AND SYNONYMOUS (IN THE WEST, AT LEAST) WITH TERRORISM, THE BINLADIN NAME WAS WELL AND FAVORABLY KNOWN THROUGHOUT SAUDI ARABIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST FOR OVER HALF A CENTURY. BUILDERS OF CHOICE TO THE SAUDI ROYAL FAMILY, AND ENTRUSTED WITH THE MOST IMPORTANT AND PRESTIGIOUS BUILDING PROJECTS, THE SAUDI BINLADIN GROUP (SBG) HAS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN S BLODGETT
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 16 FEB 2019
DATE/CASE ID: 23 OCT 2006 200602966

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SUFFERED FROM THE TARNISHING OF THE FAMILY'S GOOD NAME. SBG HAS SOUGHT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT IT HAS NO LINKS WITH THE ISLAMIST FANATIC (AND HALF BROTHER) USAMA BY PUBLICLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY CONDEMNING HIS ACTIONS AND TAKING THE NECESSARY LEGAL STEPS TO ENSURE THAT ALL CONNECTIONS HAVE BEEN SEVERED.

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END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION

THE SAUDI BINLADIN GROUP: OVERVIEW

2. (U) HEADQUARTERED IN JEDDAH, THE SAUDI BINLADIN GROUP (SBG) IS
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ONE OF SAUDI ARABIA'S LARGEST BUSINESS GROUPS. KNOWN AS BUILDERS TO THE KING, THE SBG'S BUSINESS INCLUDES CONSTRUCTION, INDUSTRIAL AND POWER PROJECTS, PETROLEUM, CHEMICALS AND MINING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE, MANUFACTURING, TRADING, AND SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS. THE FIRM'S ESTIMATED NET WORTH IS USD ONE BILLION, AND IT EMPLOYS SOME 35,000 PEOPLE. THE COMPANY HAS BEEN THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT'S PRIME CONTRACTOR FOR BUILDING THE KINGDOM'S HIGHWAYS, WAS IN CHARGE OF THE SIX BILLION DOLLAR PROJECT TO RENOVATE AND EXPAND THE HOLY MOSQUES IN MECCA AND MEDINA, AND HAS BUILT MANY OF THE PALACES OCCUPIED BY SENIOR MEMBERS OF THE ROYAL FAMILY. IT ALSO HAD A ONE BILLION DOLLAR JOINT VENTURE WITH GENERAL ELECTRIC TO BUILD A POWER PLANT IN RIYADH, AND IS BUILDING HOUSING FOR U.S. MILITARY FORCES AT BOTH ESKAN VILLAGE IN RIYADH AND PRINCE SULTAN AIRBASE NEAR AL-KHARJ. THE COMPANY HAS SUBSIDIARIES AND OFFICES IN CANADA, CYPRUS, EGYPT, FRANCE, GERMANY, JORDAN, INDONESIA, ITALY, LEBANON, MALAYSIA, SPAIN, SWITZERLAND, UAE, THE U.K. AND THE U.S. AMONG THE COMPANY'S MAJOR INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IS THE RUNWAY CONSTRUCTION AT THE NEW INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN KUALA LUMPUR.

BINLADIN GROUP ORIGINS

3. (C) THE SAUDI BINLADIN GROUP WAS ESTABLISHED IN 1990, IN A REORGANIZATION OF THE GROUP OF BUSINESSES FOUNDED IN 1931 BY MUHAMMAD BIN AWAD BIN LADIN, A YEMENI WHO EMIGRATED TO JEDDAH. MUHAMMAD BIN LADIN STARTED OUT AS A BRICKLAYER FOR ARAMCO. LACKING FORMAL EDUCATION, HE NONETHELESS PICKED UP THE PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF CIVIL ENGINEERING AND WAS REPUTED TO BE AN EXCELLENT PLANNER AND BUSINESSMAN AS WELL. HE SPECIALIZED IN ROADS AND CIVIL WORKS AND
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DEVELOPED A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH KING ABD AL-AZIZ. BY THE
TIME OF HIS UNTIMELY DEATH IN A PLANE ACCIDENT IN 1966, HIS COMPANY
HAD BEEN ENTRUSTED BY THE ROYAL FAMILY TO BUILD THE STRATEGIC
NETWORK OF ROADS NEAR YEMEN.

4. (U) MUHAMMAD BIN LADIN HAD 54 CHILDREN. 19 OF HIS SONS ARE SBG
PARTNERS, BUT ONLY 9 OR 10 ARE ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN RUNNING THE
COMPANY. SBG'S SENIOR DIRECTORS INCLUDE: BAKR BINLADIN, CHAIRMAN;
YAHYIA BINLADIN, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN; HASSAN BINLADIN, SENIOR VICE
PRESIDENT; AND SALEH BINLADIN, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT.

5. (U) SBG'S 19 PARTNERS ARE: ABDELAZIZ BINLADIN, ABDULLAH
BINLADIN, AHMAD BINLADIN, AISSA BINLADIN, BAKR BINLADIN, GHALIB
BINLADIN, HASAN BINLADIN, HAYDAR BINLADIN, KHALID BINLADIN, KHALIL
BINLADIN, MUHAMMAD BINLADIN, MAHROUS BINLADIN, SA'D BINLADIN, SALIH

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ACTION SCT-00

INFO	LOG-00	A-00	CA-02	CCO-00	SMEC-00	DOEE-00	DS-00
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	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00	NEA-01	DCP-01	NSAE-00
	OCS-03	PM-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	USSH-00
	SA-01	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/016W		

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R 160757Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6666
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AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
CIA WASHDC
NSC WASHDC

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SECDEF WASHDC
USDOC WASHDC 0954
GCC COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 RIYADH 000475

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP; LONDON FOR SUTPHIN; PARIS FOR LEAF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/09

TAGS: PGOV, PTER, ASEC, SA

SECRET

PAGE 02 RIYADH 00475 02 OF 03 160833Z
SUBJECT: THE SAUDI BINLADIN GROUP: BUILDERS TO THE KING

BINLADIN, TARIQ BINLADIN, THABIT BINLADIN, UMAR BINLADIN, YAHYIA
BINLADIN, AND YASSIR BINLADIN.

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ROYAL FAMILY

6. (C) THE SAUDI BINLADIN GROUP HAS CLOSE TIES TO THE ROYAL FAMILY, WHICH, AS MENTIONED ABOVE, DATE BACK TO THE DAYS OF KING ABD AL-AZIZ. COMPANY CHAIRMAN BAKR BIN LADIN IS SAID TO BE A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF KING FAHD. IN ADDITION TO BEING ENTRUSTED WITH THE EXPANSION OF THE TWO HOLY MOSQUES AND WITH BUILDING MANY OF THE KING'S PERSONAL RESIDENCES AND OFFICIAL COMPLEXES, BAKR HAS BEEN A REGULAR ATTENDEE AT MAJLISES AND DINNERS GIVEN BY THE KING AND THE CROWN PRINCE. BAKR IS ALSO SAID TO BE CLOSE TO RIYADH GOVERNOR PRINCE SALMAN.

SBG TIES WITH USAMA BIN LADIN

7. (U) AS ONE OF MUHAMMAD BINLADIN'S 54 CHILDREN, USAMA BIN LADIN WORKED IN AND RECEIVED A SHARE OF THE FAMILY BUSINESS. HE WAS LISTED AS A FOUNDING PARTNER OF SBG IN 1990. HOWEVER, BY THE EARLY 1990S USAMA NO LONGER WORKED FOR THE COMPANY, AND HIS TIES WITH THE SAUDI BINLADIN GROUP WERE OFFICIALLY SEVERED IN JUNE 1993, PURSUANT TO A RESOLUTION OF THE COMPANY'S BOARD OF DIRECTORS. THE TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION WAS SUBMITTED TO THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT AND PUBLISHED IN LOCAL SAUDI NEWSPAPERS. BINLADIN GROUP CHAIRMAN BAKR BIN LADIN

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ISSUED A STATEMENT IN 1994 DISASSOCIATING HIS COMPANY FROM AND CONDEMNING HIS HALF-BROTHER'S ACTIONS. IN SEPTEMBER 1998, (PROBABLY DUE TO USG SANCTIONS AND FREEZING OF USAMA BIN LADIN'S

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ASSETS) THE COMPANY ISSUED THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT ON USAMA BIN LADIN:
BEGIN TEXT:

AS CHAIRMAN OF THE SAUDI BINLADIN GROUP, I HEREBY ISSUE THE
FOLLOWING DECLARATIONS ON OUR POSITION VIS-A-VIS THE SUBJECT, USAMA
BIN MUHAMMAD BIN AWAD BIN LADIN (AKA USAMA BIN LADIN):

(1) USAMA BIN LADIN POSSESSES NO LEGAL OR BENEFICIAL INTEREST
WHATSOEVER (DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY) IN SAUDI BINLADIN GROUP OR ANY
OF ITS SUBSIDIARIES, AFFILIATES, OR OTHER ENTITIES WHICH FORM PART
OF THE BINLADIN GROUP.

(2) USAMA BIN LADIN POSSESSES NO INTEREST WHATSOEVER (DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY) IN ANY ASSETS OR ANY OTHER PROPERTY BELONGING TO THE
SAUDI BINLADIN GROUP OR ANY OF ITS SUBSIDIARIES, AFFILIATES OF
OTHER ENTITIES WHICH FORM PART OF THE SAUDI BINLADIN GROUP.

(3) USAMA BIN LADIN POSSESSES NO CONTRACTUAL, BUSINESS OR ANY OTHER
RELATIONSHIP WHATSOEVER (DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY) IN ANY ASSETS OR
ANY OTHER PROPERTY BELONGING TO THE SAUDI BINLADIN GROUP OR ANY OF
ITS SUBSIDIARIES, AFFILIATES OF OTHER ENTITIES WHICH FORM PART OF
THE SAUDI BINLADIN GROUP.


(4) USAMA BIN LADIN IS NOT FUNDED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY BY THE
SAUDI BINLADIN GROUP OR ANY OF ITS SUBSIDIARIES, AFFILIATES OF
OTHER ENTITIES WHICH FORM PART OF THE SAUDI BINLADIN GROUP.

ISSUED IN JEDDAH, KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA, ON THE 5TH DAY OF
SECRET

PAGE 04 RIYADH 00475 02 OF 03 160833Z
SEPTEMBER 1998. BAKR MUHAMMAD BINLADIN, CHAIRMAN, SAUDI BINLADIN
GROUP.

END TEXT OF SBG STATEMENT

BINLADIN FAMILY TIES TO USAMA



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SECRET

PTQ0813

PAGE 01 RIYADH 00475 03 OF 03 160833Z
ACTION SCT-00

INFO	LOG-00	A-00	CA-02	CCO-00	SMEC-00	DOEE-00	DS-00
	EUR-01	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	FBO-01	IM-01	TEDE-00	INR-00
	L-01	ADS-00	MMP-00	M-00	NEA-01	DCP-01	NSAE-00
	OCS-03	PM-00	P-00	SP-00	SSO-00	TRSE-00	USSS-00
	SA-01	ASDS-01	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-01	DRL-02	G-00
	MR-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	SWCI-00	/016W		
				-----A34E7E 160834Z /38			

R 160757Z FEB 99
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6667
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
CIA WASHDC
NSC WASHDC
SECDEF WASHDC
USDOC WASHDC 0955
GCC COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 03 RIYADH 000475

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP; LONDON FOR SUTPHIN; PARIS FOR LEAF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/09/09

TAGS: PGOV, PTER, ASEC, SA

SECRET

PAGE 02 RIYADH 00475 03 OF 03 160833Z
SUBJECT: THE SAUDI BINLADIN GROUP: BUILDERS TO THE KING

PARTNERSHIPS WITH U.S. COMPANIES

9. (U) THE SAUDI BINLADIN GROUP HAS HAD A NUMBER OF PARTNERSHIPS
WITH MAJOR U.S. COMPANIES, MOST NOTABLY,

UNCLASSIFIED

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--A PARTNERSHIP WITH ENRON INTERNATIONAL FOR A FAILED BID ON THE
1.2 BILLION SHUAIBA POWER PLANT PROJECT; AND

--A JOINT VENTURE WITH GE AND FLUOR DANIEL ON POWER PLANT 9 IN
RIYADH FOR SCECO CENTRAL.

THE COMPANY HAS ALSO HAD PARTNERSHIPS WITH RAYTHEON AND BECHTEL ON
OTHER PROJECTS IN THE KINGDOM. THE COMPANY'S U.S. OFFICE, SBG-USA,
INC IS LOCATED AT 1700 ROCKVILLE PIKE, SUITE 400, ROCKVILLE, MD.,
301-998-6165, FAX: 301-881-6898. THE OFFICE IS HEADED BY FORMER
FSO PHILIP J. GRIFFIN.
FOWLER

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

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E9

SECRET

PTQ6180

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 RIYADH 03900 141442Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 SAS-00 /000W
-----1B185E 141442Z /38

O 141440Z DEC 99
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9693

S E C R E T RIYADH 003900

DECAPTIONED

NODIS

DEPT PLS PASS TO ABU DHABI, ISLAMABAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6 (X5) (X6)
TAGS: PTER, PREL, SA
SUBJECT: SAUDIS ON USG WARNING TO TALIBAN CONCERNING UBL THREATS

REF: (A) STATE 233908; (B) STATE 233914

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY CDA ALBERT THIBAUT. REASON: 1.5 (B), (C), (D)
1.6 (X5).

2. (S) DRAWING ON REF (A) INSTRUCTIONS, ON DECEMBER 14 CHARGE
DEMARCHED [REDACTED] MFA [REDACTED]

B1

REGARDING THE RECENTLY DISCOVERED UBL-INSPIRED PLOT TO ATTACK
AMERICANS DURING THE MILLENIUM AND RAMADAN. CHARGE STATED THAT THE
EVIDENCE OF SUCH PLOTTING WAS INCONTROVERTIBLE, WITH PLANNING
HAVING PROGRESSED TO SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL ISSUES BEFORE THE

SECRET

PAGE 02 RIYADH 03900 141442Z
TERRORISTS WERE APPREHENDED IN A NEIGHBORING ARAB COUNTRY. CHARGE
STRESSED THAT SUCH EVIDENCE BELIED TALIBAN PLEDGES TO KEEP TIGHT
CONTROL OVER BIN LADIN AND TO KEEP HIM FROM PLANNING FURTHER
TERRORIST OPERATIONS. CHARGE ADDED THAT, IN THE WAKE OF THIS
DISCOVERY, WE WERE DELIVERING A STRONG AND UNMISTAKABLE MESSAGE TO
THE TALIBAN THAT SHOULD SUCH ATTACKS OCCUR, THEY AND BIN LADIN WILL
BE SUBJECT TO SWIFT AND SERIOUS RESPONSE. HANDING OVER REF (A)
TP'S IN ENGLISH AND ARABIC, HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE NEED NOW IS FOR
KEY COUNTRIES SUCH AS SAUDI ARABIA TO USE THEIR CHANNELS TO CONVEY
A SIMILAR MESSAGE TO THE TALIBAN AND TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH
PAKISTAN TO ENSURE THAT THE MESSAGE IS REINFORCED BY ISLAMABAD.

3. (S) [REDACTED]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN S BLODGETT
DATE/CASE ID: 23 OCT 2006 200602966

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[REDACTED] LISTENED INTENTLY, COMMENTING THAT THE SAG TOOK SUCH INFORMATION VERY SERIOUSLY. [REDACTED] POINTED OUT THAT THE THREAT WAS NOT NECESSARILY LIMITED TO ONE PLACE BECAUSE OTHER GROUPS MAY BE BENT ON THE SAME COURSE AS THOSE WHO HAD BEEN APPREHENDED. [REDACTED] STATED HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY BRING OUR DEMARCHE TO THE ATTENTION OF [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SENIOR SAUDI OFFICIALS.

4. (S) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CHARGE

POINTED OUT THAT THE TALIBAN CONTINUE TO HAVE DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION IN RIYADH (AT THE CHARGE LEVEL), ADDING THAT WE ALSO WOULD LIKE OUR MESSAGE TO BE EMPHASIZED BY THE PAKISTANIS, WHO ARE IN ACTIVE CONTACT WITH THE SAG. [REDACTED] TOOK THE POINT, STATING THAT THE U.S. AND SAUDI ARABIA FACE A COMMON THREAT AND DANGER. THIBAUT

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PAGE 03 RIYADH 03900 141442Z

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

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PTQ5822

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 ISLAMA 00396 01 OF 10 220813Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 SAS-00 /000W
-----2974E1 220814Z /38

O 220807Z JAN 00
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3769

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 10 ISLAMABAD 000396

NODIS

DECAPTIONED

PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR RIEDEL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X6
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, PTER, PK
SUBJECT: INDERFURTH DELEGATION MEETING WITH
GENERAL MUSHARRAF


(U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR WILLIAM B MILAM.
REASON: 1.6X6

SUMMARY

B1

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3. (U) A DELEGATION LED BY SA ASSISTANT SECRETARY KARL F. INDERFURTH AND COUNTERTERRORISM COORDINATOR MICHAEL SHEEHAN MET WITH CHIEF EXECUTIVE PERVEZ MUSHARRAF AT THE FORMER OFFICIAL RESIDENCE OF THE PRIME MINISTER ON JANUARY 21. AMBASSADOR MILAM, NSC DIRECTOR DONALD CAMP, S/CT ASSISTANT NICOLE BIBBINS AND POLCOUNS (NOTETAKER) ALSO PARTICIPATED FOR THE U.S. SIDE. GENERAL MUSHARRAF WAS ACCOMPANIED BY FOREIGN SECRETARY SHAMSHAD AHMAD, AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. MALEEHA LOHDI AND MFA AMERICAS DIRECTOR GENERAL RIFFAT IQBAL.

U.S. PRESENTATION

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49. (U) ASSISTANT SECRETARY INDERFURTH,
COUNTERTERRORISM COORDINATOR SHEEHAN AND NSC
DIRECTOR CAMP CLEARED THIS MESSAGE.

SECRET

PAGE 02 ISLAMA 00396 10 OF 10 220816Z
MILAM

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

UNCLASSIFIED

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E16

SECRET

PT06945

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 STATE 073803 190221Z
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 SAS-00 /000R

DRAFTED BY:S/S-O:CHRISTOPHER J MCMULLEN
APPROVED BY:S/S-O:CHRISTOPHER J MCMULLEN

-----4D77A2 190222Z /38

O 190221Z APR 00 ZFF5
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 073803

DECAPTIONED

NODIS

LONDON PLS PASS U/S PICKERING - TOPOL 4060

FOLLOWING STATE 073803 DATED 19 APR 00, SENT ACTION
ISLAMABAD BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO.
QUOTE:

S E C R E T STATE 073803

NODIS

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR AND DCM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/10
TAGS: OVIP (CLINTON, WILLIAM J.), PREL, PK
SUBJECT: RESTRICTED MEETING WITH CHIEF EXECUTIVE GENERAL
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 073803 190221Z
PERVEZ MUSHARRAF OF PAKISTAN

CLASSIFIED BY NSC EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ROBERT A. BRADTKE.
REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

1. (U) THIS CABLE CONTAINS A MEMORANDUM OF THE PRESIDENT'S
CONVERSATION WITH PERVEZ MUSHARRAF ON MARCH 25, 2000. I
ASK THAT YOU NOT PERMIT COPIES TO BE MADE OF THIS MESSAGE,
AND THAT YOU NOT DISTRIBUTE IT OUTSIDE OF THE MISSION'S
EXECUTIVE OFFICE.

2. (U) PARTICIPANTS:U.S.
THE PRESIDENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN S BLODGETT
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 5 APR 2020
DATE/CASE ID: 27 OCT 2006 200602966

UNCLASSIFIED

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MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, SECRETARY OF STATE
JOHN PODESTA, CHIEF OF STAFF
SAMUEL BERGER, ASSISTANT TO THE
PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
WILLIAM MILAM, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO
PAKISTAN

BRUCE RIEDEL, NSC NOTETAKER


PAKISTAN
CHIEF EXECUTIVE GENERAL PERVEZ
MUSHARRAF ABDUL SATTAR, FOREIGN
MINISTER
INAMUL HAQUE, FOREIGN SECRETARY
MALEEHA LODHI, AMBASSADOR TO THE
UNITED
STATES
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 073803 190221Z

3. (U) DATE, TIME AND PLACE:

MARCH 25, 2000, 1:35 - 2:55 P.M.,
ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN

4. (U) GENERAL MUSHARRAF: I WELCOME YOU TO PAKISTAN.
I ONLY WISH YOU COULD STAY WITH US LONGER SO THAT WE COULD
SHOW YOU OUR TRADITIONAL HOSPITALITY AND OUR CULTURE.
PERHAPS WE COULD EVEN HAVE A GAME OF GOLF TOGETHER. I
UNDERSTAND YOU ARE VERY GOOD AT GOLF.



B1


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
SECRET

PAGE 04

STATE 073803 190221Z



10. (U) THANK YOU AGAIN FOR COMING.



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21. (U) I HAVE STUDIED THE HISTORY OF KASHMIR. MRS.
SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 073803 190221Z
ALBRIGHT'S FATHER WROTE A BOOK ON IT I HAVE READ. I AM
FAMILIAR WITH THE UN RESOLUTIONS AND DOCUMENTS.


UNCLASSIFIED

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28. (U) I AM THE FIRST PRESIDENT TO BE HERE IN THIRTY
YEARS. THE FIRST IN INDIA IN 22 YEARS.

UNCLASSIFIED


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38. (U) GENERAL MUSHARRAF (INTERRUPTS): AMERICAN CHILDREN.



40. (U) GENERAL MUSHARRAF: I APPRECIATE THAT.



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
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-- END OF CONVERSATION --
TALBOTT UNQUOTE TALBOTT

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

@@@OASYS@@@<CONCATENATED>

SECRET

PTO6848

PAGE 01 STATE 073803 190111Z
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 SAS-00 /000R

073803

SOURCE: KODAKA.019006

DRAFTED BY: TEXT RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE -- 04/18/00 7-9823

APPROVED BY: SA/PAB:JLUNSTEAD

S/S:HKTHOMAS S/S-O:CMCMULLEN

-----4D722D 190115Z /38

O 190111Z APR 00 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 073803

NODIS

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR AND DCM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/10

TAGS: OVIP (CLINTON, WILLIAM J.), PREL, PK

SUBJECT: RESTRICTED MEETING WITH CHIEF EXECUTIVE GENERAL
PERVEZ MUSHARRAF OF PAKISTAN

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PAGE 02 STATE 073803 190111Z
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2. (U) PARTICIPANTS:U.S.

THE PRESIDENT

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
PAKISTAN
CHIEF EXECUTIVE GENERAL PERVEZ
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
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PAGE 03 STATE 073803 190111Z
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


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10. (U) THANK YOU AGAIN FOR COMING.




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
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
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38. (U) GENERAL MUSHARRAF (INTERRUPTS): AMERICAN CHILDREN.



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-- END OF CONVERSATION --

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B1, 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 STATE 185645 262311Z
ORIGIN SCT-00

INFO	LOG-00	MFA-01	NP-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	INL-00
	DODE-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	FBO-01	VC-00	TEDE-00	INR-00
	IO-00	VCE-00	MMP-00	AC-01	NEA-00	DCP-01	NSAE-00
	OIC-02	ACE-00	P-00	IRM-00	SS-00	SA-00	ASDS-01
	DSCC-00	SAS-00	/007R				

185645

SOURCE: KODAKA.026222

DRAFTED BY: S/CT: HDIEHL/SA/PAB:JLUNSTEAD -- 09/26/00 647-9413 PAKPOL

APPROVED BY: SA:KFINDERFURTH

S/CT:EHULL P:JLAPENN CIA/CTC:TPALLAS

INR/TNC:MSTEINITZ IO/UNP: LVIGUERIE P: MFITZPATRICK

-----8A3B54 262312Z /38

O 262310Z SEP 00

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 185645

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/22/10

TAGS: PTER, PREL, ASEC, PK

SUBJECT: PAKISTANI SUPPORT FOR TALIBAN

CLASSIFIED BY: KARL F. INDERFURTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
SA. REASON: 1.5 (B) (C) (D)

1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE FOR EMBASSY ISLAMABAD.

2. (S) DEPARTMENT IS CONCERNED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 185645 262311Z

PAKISTAN IS STEPPING UP SUPPORT TO THE TALIBAN'S MILITARY
CAMPAIGN IN AFGHANISTAN. DEPARTMENT IS PARTICULARLY
CONCERNED BY REPORTS THAT ISLAMABAD MAY ALLOW THE TALIBAN
TO USE PAKISTANI TERRITORY TO OUTFLANK NORTHERN ALLIANCE
POSITIONS IN AFGHANISTAN. WHILE PAKISTANI SUPPORT FOR THE
TALIBAN HAS BEEN LONG-STANDING, THE MAGNITUDE OF RECENT
SUPPORT IS UNPRECEDENTED.

3. (S/REL) CHARGE SHOULD RAISE ISSUE WITH [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] UPON HIS RETURN TO
POST, AMBASSADOR SHOULD SEEK EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO BRING
USG CONCERNS TO ATTENTION OF [REDACTED] DRAWING UPON THE

B1

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN S BLODGETT
DATE/CASE ID: 23 OCT 2006 200602966

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UNCLASSIFIED

POINTS BELOW.

- AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE, THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO REGARD THE ACTIONS OF THE TALIBAN - PARTICULARLY ITS SUPPORT FOR USAMA BIN LADIN AND OTHER TERRORISTS - AS INIMICAL TO OUR INTERESTS, TO THE INTERESTS OF PAKISTAN, AND TO THE STABILITY OF THIS REGION OF THE WORLD.
- SECRETARY ALBRIGHT STATED IN NEW YORK AT THE SIX PLUS TWO MEETING THAT "TO BE ACCEPTED AS A MEMBER OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY, A COUNTRY MUST BEHAVE BY INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS. BY THIS MEASURE, THE TALEBAN HAVE TRULY FAILED."
- WE ARE INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT REPORTS OF GROWING PAKISTANI SUPPORT FOR THE TALIBAN'S MILITARY OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN.
- WE HAVE SEEN REPORTS THAT PAKISTAN IS PROVIDING THE
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 185645 262311Z
TALIBAN WITH MATERIEL, FUEL, FUNDING, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, AND MILITARY ADVISORS. WE ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT LARGE NUMBERS OF PAKISTANI NATIONALS HAVE RECENTLY MOVED INTO AFGHANISTAN TO FIGHT FOR THE TALIBAN, APPARENTLY WITH THE TACIT ACQUIESCENCE OF THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT.

- OUR REPORTS FURTHER SUGGEST THAT DIRECT PAKISTANI INVOLVEMENT IN TALIBAN MILITARY OPERATIONS HAS INCREASED IN THE PAST FEW MONTHS.
- WE FIND ESPECIALLY TROUBLING SPECULATION THAT THE TALIBAN MIGHT MAKE USE OF PAKISTANI TERRITORY TO CONDUCT MILITARY ATTACKS AND THAT PAKISTANI MILITARY PERSONNEL MIGHT TAKE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN THE FIGHTING.
- WE URGE THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN TO IMMEDIATELY CEASE SUCH MILITARY SUPPORT, WHICH IS ENCOURAGING THE TALIBAN TO PURSUE A MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE AFGHAN CONFLICT. AS SECRETARY ALBRIGHT NOTED ON SEPTEMBER 15 IN HER OPENING STATEMENT AT THE SIX-PLUS-TWO MEETING, PEACE CAN BEST BE ACHIEVED BY A CEASE-FIRE AND AN END TO THE KILLING, FOLLOWED BY NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE VARIOUS

AFGHAN PARTIES THAT ARE NOT CONSTRAINED BY
PRECONDITIONS.
- WE BELIEVE THAT A TALIBAN MILITARY VICTORY WILL NOT SERVE

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YOUR INTERESTS.

- THE US WILL NOT ACCEPT SUCH A VICTORY. TALIBAN MILITARY
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 185645 262311Z

CONQUEST WILL NOT LEAD TO THE UN SEAT OR INTERNATIONAL
RECOGNITION. WITH TALIBAN CONTINUING THEIR CURRENT
POLICIES, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL NOT CHANGE
ITS POSITION.

- CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS (AND RUSSIA) ALSO LIKELY TO
BECOME MORE HOSTILE TO TALIBAN. THIS DOES NOT SERVE
PAKISTAN'S INTEREST OF CLOSER ECONOMIC/POLITICAL TIES TO
CENTRAL ASIA.
- WE UNDERSTAND PAKISTAN'S DESIRE FOR A GOVERNMENT IN KABUL
WHICH IS STABLE AND FURTHER PAKISTAN'S INTERESTS. WE DO
NOT THINK THE TALIBAN CAN DO EITHER OF THESE.
- THIS DOES NOT MEAN WE BELIEVE MASOOD IS THE ANSWER. HE
ALSO CANNOT BRING PEACE/STABILITY.
- DON'T MISUNDERSTAND, WE ARE NOT DIVORCED FROM REALITY. WE
KNOW THE TALIBAN ARE A FEATURE OF AFGHAN POLITICAL
LANDSCAPE WHICH WILL HAVE TO BE DEALT WITH, AND WILL BE
PART OF ANY POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.
- ANSWER IS A BROADER PEACE PROCESS, IN WHICH TALIBAN,
NORTHERN ALLIANCE AND OTHER PARTIES CAN PARTICIPATE.
- AS YOU KNOW SECRETARY ALBRIGHT REQUESTED SYG ANNAN AT 6
PLUS 2 TO SEND HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE VENDRELL BACK
TO REGION TO CONTACT ALL INTERESTED GROUPS AND PARTIES.
FOREIGN MINISTER SATTAR AGREED TO THIS APPROACH.
- WE ARE WILLING TO WORK WITH YOU AND OTHER RELEVANT STATES
SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 185645 262311Z

AND ACTORS TO TRY TO MAKE SUCH AN APPROACH WORK. PERHAPS
VENDRELL CAN GET ALL SIDES TO SIT DOWN AND AGREE TO
DISCUSS HOW AFGHANISTAN SHOULD BE GOVERNED, NOT WHO
SHOULD GOVERN.

- CONTINUED FIGHTING UNDERMINES THIS PROCESS AND WILL NOT
LEAD TO WHAT YOU WANT. A GENUINE NEGOTIATING PROCESS
MIGHT.
- REMIND YOU AGAIN HOWEVER THAT WE WILL NOT ACCEPT A

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TALIBAN VICTORY AND DO NOT BELIEVE OTHERS WILL EITHER.
TALIBAN VICTORY WILL NOT BRING PEACE AND STABILITY - BUT
RATHER FURTHER UNREST. NOR WILL IT AVERT FURTHER
MEASURES IN SECURITY COUNCIL. IT WILL NOT SERVE
PAKISTAN'S INTEREST. A WAY MUST BE FOUND TO WORK
TOGETHER TO SERVE BOTH OUR INTERESTS.
ALBRIGHT

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

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RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 STATE 041824 081713Z
ORIGIN SS-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	AEX-01	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00
	INL-00	DODE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	FBIE-00	VC-00	TEDE-00
	INR-00	VCE-00	M-00	NEA-00	NSAE-00	IRM-00	DSCC-00
	SAS-00	/001R					

041824

SOURCE: KODAKC.008070

DRAFTED BY: S/S-S:DAKONEFF -- 03/05/01; EXT. 75131

APPROVED BY: S/S:CCWALSH

NEA:NWALKER

S:AWOLFF S/S-O:KMERTEN

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 041824

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/04/11

TAGS: OVIP (POWELL, COLIN P.) PREL, XF, SA

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S 26 FEBRUARY MEETING WITH SAUDI CROWN
PRINCE ABDULLAH

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY NEAL
WALSH, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D)
2. (U) FEBRUARY 26, 2001, CROWN PRINCE'S PALACE, RIYADH
3. (U) PARTICIPANTS:

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 041824 081713Z

U.S.:

THE SECRETARY

WYCHE FOWLER, AMBASSADOR

EDWARD S. WALKER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN
AFFAIRS

BRUCE RIEDEL, NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

ALEX WOLFF, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY

CHARLES BRAYSHAW, NOTETAKER

GEMAL HELAL, INTERPRETER

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN S BLODGETT
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)
DECLASSIFY AFTER: 4 MAR 2021
DATE/CASE ID: 23 OCT 2006 200602966

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SAUDI ARABIA:

CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH
FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD AL FAISAL
AMBASSADOR TO U.S. BANDAR BIN SULTAN

4. (S) SUMMARY: IN HIS MEETING OVER LUNCH WITH CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH, THE SECRETARY BRIEFED ABDULLAH ON THE GENERAL APPROACH THE U.S. INTENDED TO TAKE IN DEALING WITH SADDAM HUSSEIN.

B1

THE SECRETARY SAID THE U.S. WAS ANXIOUS TO WORK WITH ITS FRIENDS IN THE REGION TO DEVELOP AN EFFECTIVE APPROACH ON IRAQ IN ADVANCE OF THE ARAB SUMMIT IN AMMAN IN MARCH. END SUMMARY

5. (S) DURING LUNCH AT THE CROWN PRINCE'S PALACE, THE SECRETARY DESCRIBED THE APPROACH THE U.S. INTENDED TO TAKE
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 041824 081713Z
IN RESPONSE TO THE EROSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS REGIME FOR IRAQ.

THE SECRETARY SAID THE U.S. WOULD BEGIN BY SPEAKING FIRST AND FOREMOST ABOUT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, NOT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. PEOPLE NEEDED TO UNDERSTAND THAT WMD WAS THE ISSUE, NOT FOOD. SECONDLY, THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES SHOULD ENSURE STRICT CONTROLS FOR WMD ITEMS AND STOP BLOCKING NON-MILITARY USE ITEMS THAT EMPOWERED SADDAM BY GIVING THE IRAQI PEOPLE CAUSE TO BLAME THE WEST. AT THE SAME TIME, EVERYONE SHOULD RENEW EFFORTS TO STOP LEAKAGE IN THE SANCTIONS REGIME VIA JORDAN, TURKEY, AND OTHER COUNTRIES.

6. (S) WITH RENEWED UNITY WOULD COME LEVERAGE TO ALLOW UN WEAPONS INSPECTORS BACK INTO IRAQ, THE SECRETARY CONTINUED. IF SADDAM WOULD NOT ALLOW THE INSPECTORS TO

RETURN, THE ALLIES WOULD RETAIN CONTROL OF HIS MONEY. WE MUST ALSO RETAIN THE ABILITY TO STRIKE AT WMD TARGETS IN IRAQ IF REBUILT PRODUCTION FACILITIES WERE DISCOVERED.

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[REDACTED] THE SECRETARY TOLD ABDULLAH THAT THE
PRESIDENT HAD NOT MADE DECISIONS ON THESE ISSUES AND WAS
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PAGE 04 STATE 041824 081713Z
ANXIOUS TO HAVE THE VIEWS OF HIS FRIENDS. THE PRESIDENT
HOPED TO HAVE A NEW POLICY IN PLACE BY THE TIME OF THE
ARAB SUMMIT IN AMMAN.

7. (S) [REDACTED]

POWELL

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PAGE 01 STATE 109130 220202Z
ORIGIN SA-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AEX-00	ACQ-00	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	COME-00
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	OIGO-00	E-00	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	VC-00	TEDE-00	INR-00
	LAB-01	L-00	VCE-00	MMP-00	AC-01	NEA-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	CAEX-01	PA-00	PM-00	ACE-00	SCT-00	SP-00
	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00	ASDS-01	R-00	PMB-00
	DSCC-00	DRL-02	G-00	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/006R	

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SOURCE: KODAKA.022005

DRAFTED BY: SA/PAB:PSDHILLON 01PAKPOL\T-6-S-SATTAR-LUNCH -- 06/21/01

APPROVED BY: SA:CBROCCA

S:CKELLY SA:AWEASTHAM SA/PAB: JJLUNSTEAD

S/S:CARODLEY S/S-O:MFORINO

DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:

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AMCONSUL PESHAWAR IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 109130

E.O. 12958: DECL: DECL: 06/19/11

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 109130 220202Z

TAGS: OVIP, PREL, KDEM, MCAP, PTER, PHUM, ECON, PK, IN, AF

SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S LUNCH WITH PAKISTANI FOREIGN

MINISTER ABDUL SATTAR

REF: STATE 74066

(U) CLASSIFIED BY THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY, CHRISTINA B.

ROCCA,, BUREAU OF SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND

(D)

1. (U) JUNE 19, 12:00 NOON, THE SECRETARY'S DINING ROOM.

2. (U) PARTICIPANTS:

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN S BLODGETT

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

DECLASSIFY AFTER: 19 JUN 2011

DATE/CASE ID: 23 OCT 2006 200602966

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UNITED STATES

THE SECRETARY
U/S LARSON
U/S BOLTON
U/S DOBRIANSKY
A/S CHRISTINA ROCCA
A/S RICHARD BOUCHER

S/P DIRECTOR RICHARD HAASS
DAS ALAN EASTHAM
NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR TORKEL PATTERSON
S-STAFF CRAIG KELLY
SA/PAB PUSHPINDER DHILLON (NOTETAKER)

PAKISTAN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 109130 220202Z
FOREIGN MINISTER SATTAR
AMBASSADOR MALEEHA LODHI
RIAZ M KHAN, MFA ADDITIONAL SECRETARY
AZIZ A KHAN, MFA ADDITIONAL SECRETARY
MAJOR GENERAL FAIZ JILANI, ISI OPERATIONS
MAJOR GENERAL AHMED KIDWAI, NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY
ZAMIR AKRAM, DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION
BRIGADIER SYED M. MUJTABA, DEFENSE ATTACHE
MASOOD KHAN, POLITICAL COUNSELOR
SYED Z GARDEZI, MFA DIRECTOR

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[REDACTED]

4. (C) THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE TALIBAN AND ITS THREAT TO REGIONAL STABILITY AS IT TRIES TO SPREAD ITS IDEOLOGY. SATTAR, AZIZ KHAN, AND GENERAL JILANI ENCOURAGED ENGAGEMENT WITH THE TALIBAN RATHER THAN ISOLATION. THEY PAINTED THE TALIBAN LEADERSHIP AS YOUNG, UNEDUCATED MEN, WHOSE EXPERIENCES ARE LIMITED TO STRUGGLE AND WAR, AND WHO WOULD MODERATE THEIR VIEWS ONCE THEY GAIN EXPOSURE TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD. SATTAR CHARACTERIZED THE GOP-TALIBAN AS "REASONABLE," BUT ONE WITH ITS OWN PROBLEMS -- SMUGGLING, REFUGEES, AND FUGITIVES. HE CLAIMED THAT THE GOP HAD ONLY LIMITED INFLUENCE WITH THE TALIBAN, WHICH LISTENS BUT ACTS IN ITS OWN INTERESTS.

[REDACTED]

END SUMMARY.

SANCTIONS

5. (C) CONCLUDING A CONVERSATION THAT HAD BEGUN BEFORE LUNCH, THE SECRETARY TOLD SATTAR THE SANCTIONS WERE UNDER REVIEW, AND WE WOULD SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE. THE SECRETARY EXPLAINED THAT SANCTIONS OFTEN ARE A SUBSTITUTE FOR EVEN MORE PUNITIVE ACTIONS. MEANWHILE, AS WE REVIEW SANCTIONS, HE SAID, IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE GOP TO DO ITS PART BY SHOWING PROGRESS ON ISSUES OF CONCERN TO US, THUS "GIVING US AMMO" TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUE. HE NOTED THAT HE WAS A GREAT BELIEVER IN MILITARY TRAINING PROGRAMS SUCH AS


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PAGE 05 STATE 109130 220202Z
IMET -- NOW PROHIBITED BY SANCTIONS -- WHICH ALLOW BOTH
SIDES TO LEARN MUCH FROM EACH OTHER.

[REDACTED]


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TALIBAN

12. (C) THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE UNITED STATES AND PAKISTAN HAVE DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ABOUT THE TALIBAN. WE, ALONG WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, VIEW THE TALIBAN AS A SOURCE OF CONCERN FOR REGIONAL STABILITY AS IT ATTEMPTS TO SPREAD ITS VALUES AND IDEOLOGY TO ITS NEIGHBORS. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE ASKED SATTAR TO COMMENT ON THE GOP'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE TALIBAN, AND ON HOW MUCH INFLUENCE THE GOP HAD WITH THE TALIBAN.

15. (C) SATTAR URGED ENGAGEMENT WITH THE TALIBAN BECAUSE, ON BALANCE, THE ADVANTAGE OF ENGAGEMENT EXCEEDS THE DISADVANTAGES OF CONFRONTATION OR ISOLATION.

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16. (C) AZIZ KHAN AND GENERAL JILANI SUGGESTED THAT THE
TALIBAN SHOULD BE HANDLED WITH PATIENCE. [REDACTED]

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

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B1, 1.4(D)

PAGE 01 STATE 111711 270312Z
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 SAS-00 /000R

111711

SOURCE: KODAKA.027036

DRAFTED BY: S/CT:CAKIERSCHT;TALIBAN-WARNINGREGULTHREATS JUNE01 -- 06/2

APPROVED BY: P:MGROSSMAN

S/CT:WONG SA/PAB:EASTHAM/SMCGANN NEA:JLARocco

INR/TNC:MSTEINITZ DS:JMORTON P:TLENDERKING CA:DANDRUCH

S/S: LJTRACY NSC:DHAAS S/S-O:MTEKACH-BALL

-----FDFD7A 270313Z /38

O 270311Z JUN 01 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 111711

DECAPTIONED

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6 (X5) (X6)

TAGS: PTER, PREL, UNSC, PK, AF

SUBJECT: TERRORISM: DEMARCHE ON THREAT BY AFGHAN-BASED
TERRORISTS

CLASSIFIED BY: UNDERSECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS MARC
GROSSMAN. REASONS: 1.5 (B) (C) (D), 1.6 (X5)..

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 111711 270312Z

1. (SBU) THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE.

2. (S) THE USG HAS INFORMATION LEADING IT TO BELIEVE THAT
AFGHAN-BASED AND OTHER OPERATIVES ARE PLANNING TO CARRY OUT
ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST AMERICANS ABROAD. IN LIGHT OF
THIS INFORMATION, EMBASSY ISLAMABAD IS ASKED TO APPROACH
THE TALIBAN TO UNDERScore THE MESSAGE THAT THEY WILL BE
HELD DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY LOSS OF LIFE THAT OCCURS
FROM TERRORIST ACTIONS RELATED TO TERRORISTS WHO HAVE
TRAINED IN AFGHANISTAN OR USE AFGHANISTAN AS A BASE OF
PLANNING OR OPERATIONS. DEPARTMENT ASKS AMBASSADOR MILAM

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN S BLODGETT
DATE/CASE ID: 23 OCT 2006 200602966

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TO CONVEY TO THE APPROPRIATE TALIBAN REPRESENTATIVE POINTS IN PARA 3 TO UNDERSCORE THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE MESSAGE. IN PARA 4, AMBASSADOR MILAM IS ASKED TO DOUBLE-TRACK THIS MESSAGE WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN (GOP) AND ASK FOR

GOP SUPPORT. IN PARA 5, AMBASSADOR KATTOUF AND CG DUBAI ARE ASKED TO DOUBLE-TRACK THE MESSAGE WITH THE UAEG AND ASK FOR THEIR SUPPORT.

3. (S) AMBASSADOR MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING POINTS IN MAKING THIS DEMARCHE.

--WE BELIEVE THAT AFGHAN-BASED AND OTHER OPERATIVES ARE NOW PLANNING ON CARRYING OUT ATTACKS AGAINST AMERICANS. WE HAVE A HIGH DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE IN THE SERIOUSNESS OF THIS THREAT.

--WE WILL HOLD YOU DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY ACTIONS AGAINST AMERICAN CITIZENS TAKEN BY THE TERRORISTS YOU
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
PAGE 03 STATE 111711 270312Z
HARBOR.

--YOU WILL ALSO BE HELD RESPONSIBLE BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR HAVING HARBORED THESE TERRORISTS.

--THE U.S. RESERVES THE RIGHT TO DEFEND ITSELF.

--YOU SHOULD IMMEDIATELY PUT AN END TO THESE ACTIVITIES.

4. (S) AMBASSADOR MILAM IS REQUESTED TO APPRISE THE GOP OF THE MESSAGE TO THE TALIBAN AND ASK FOR GOP SUPPORT TO REINFORCE WITH THE TALIBAN THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH WE VIEW THESE ACTIVITIES. AMBASSADOR SHOULD ALSO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF GOP EFFORTS TO INTERRUPT ANY TRANSIT OR ACTIVITY OF THESE AFGHAN-BASED OPERATIVES IN PAKISTAN.



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PAGE 01 STATE 117132 052048Z
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 CCOE-00 SAS-00 /000R

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SOURCE: KODAKA.005041

DRAFTED BY: NEA:MSCHWEITZER-BLUHM -- 07/03/01 7-8879

APPROVED BY: S:CKELLY

S/ES:CRODLEY NEA:WBURNS NSC:BRIEDEL

S/ES-O:NBROWN

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TO AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE

DECAPTIONED

S E C R E T STATE 117132

NODIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/28/11

TAGS: OVIP (POWELL, COLIN L.), PREL, KPAL

SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S JUNE 29 MEETING WITH SAUDI CROWN

PRINCE ABDULLAH

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 117132 052048Z

CLASSIFIED BY NEA ASSISTANT SECRETARY WILLIAM J. BURNS.

REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D).

1. (U) PARTICIPANTS:

U.S.

THE SECRETARY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURNS, NEA

ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOUCHER, PA

MR. BRUCE RIEDEL, NSC

GEN ABIZAID, JCS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN S BLODGETT
DATE/CASE ID: 23 OCT 2006 200602966

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MR. CRAIG KELLY, S
MR. GEMAL HELAL, NEA
MS. MICHAELA SCHWEITZER-BLUHM, NOTETAKER

SAUDI ARABIA

CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH
PRINCE NAWWAF
FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD
PRINCE ABDELILLA
PRINCE BANDAR, AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S.
MR. RIHAB MASSOUD
MR. ADEL AL-JUBEIR, NOTETAKER

2. (S) SUMMARY: THE SECRETARY AND CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH
MET IN PARIS TO REVIEW THE SECRETARY'S MEETINGS IN THE
REGION TO REINVIGORATE THE CEASE-FIRE BETWEEN THE ISRAELIS
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 117132 052048Z
AND PALESTINIANS.

B1

[REDACTED] THE SECRETARY
ASSURED THE CROWN PRINCE THAT THE U.S. WAS CONCERNED WITH
BOTH PARTIES' RIGHTS AND HOPED TO FIND A SOLUTION THAT
BROUGHT PEACE AND WAS FAIR. THE U.S. SHARES THE SAME
HOPES FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE THAT SAUDI ARABIA DOES,
BUT THE SECRETARY SAID HE CANNOT MOVE FORWARD UNTIL THERE
IS AN END TO VIOLENCE AND PROGRESS ON THE MUTUALLY AGREED
TIMELINE. THE SECRETARY AND THE CROWN PRINCE ALSO
DISCUSSED THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL DISCUSSIONS ON THE IRAQ
RESOLUTION, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] END SUMMARY.

3. (S) THE SECRETARY BEGAN THE MEETING BY NOTING HIS
DISCUSSIONS OVER THE PRECEDING 48 HOURS HAD BEEN
DIFFICULT, BUT HE WAS HOPEFUL. THE SECRETARY EXPLAINED TO
THE CROWN PRINCE THAT HE HAD DELIVERED A CONSISTENT
MESSAGE TO BOTH PARTIES THAT VIOLENCE MUST BE REDUCED AND
PEOPLE MUST BE MADE TO FEEL SECURE IN THEIR HOMES AND
WORKPLACES. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THESE STEPS NEEDED TO BE
UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE MITCHELL PLAN. [REDACTED]

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8. (S) THE SECRETARY AGREED THE US RELATIONSHIP WITH THE KINGDOM WAS STRONG AND SOLID AND WOULD ENDURE. THE U.S., THE SECRETARY ARGUED, HAS ALWAYS BEEN A LEADER IN SEEKING FREEDOM AND JUSTICE FOR PEOPLE AROUND THE WORLD. IT HAS A HISTORY AND FRIENDSHIP WITH ISRAEL OVER THE LAST 53 YEARS, BUT THE U.S. ALSO HAS RESPECT AND FRIENDSHIP FOR THE PALESTINIANS. HE REMINDED THE CROWN PRINCE THAT THE U.S. HAS BEEN WORKING TOWARDS A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE PALESTINIANS AND ISRAELIS THROUGHOUT MANY ADMINISTRATIONS. IN THE CURRENT SITUATION, THOUGH,

THE SECRETARY CANNOT MOVE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD WHILE VIOLENCE CONTINUES. HE REMINDED THE CROWN PRINCE THAT

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ROCKS WERE NOT WHAT KILLED 20 ISRAELI TEENAGERS IN A NIGHTCLUB IN TEL AVIV.

9. (S)

THE SECRETARY WANTS TO IMPROVE THE PALESTINIAN ECONOMY, WANTS TO GET PALESTINIANS BACK TO THEIR JOBS AND SCHOOLS, WANTS TO SEE AN END TO THE KILLING OF CHILDREN (PALESTINIAN AND ISRAELI), BUT NONE OF THIS WILL HAPPEN IF THE VIOLENCE DOES NOT GO DOWN.

11. (S) IRAQ: THE SECRETARY REPORTED THAT THERE WAS NOW P-4 CONSENSUS ON THE IRAQ RESOLUTION AT THE UN, WITH ONLY RUSSIA STILL HOLDING OUT FOR THEIR OWN VERSION OF THE RESOLUTION.

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PAGE 01 STATE 182167 191235Z
ORIGIN INR-00

INFO LOG-00 AF-00 CA-01 CIAE-00 WHA-00 DS-00 EAP-00
EUR-00 FBIE-00 UTED-00 FSI-00 TEDE-00 INSE-00 IO-00
NEA-00 NSAE-00 CAEX-01 SCT-00 SSO-00 SS-00 USIE-00
VO-03 SA-00 ASDS-01 SNIS-00 NISC-00 DSCC-00 SAS-00
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SOURCE: KODAKB.018139

DRAFTED BY: INR/IC: [REDACTED]

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APPROVED BY: CA/VO:WGGRIFFITH

INR/IC/TIPOFF [REDACTED] INR/IC: [REDACTED] S/ES-O:SMROBINSON

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AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
AMCONSUL LAHORE
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
CIA WASHDC 0000
USDOC WASHDC 0000
USCUSTOMS

RELEASED IN PART
B6, B2

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SECDEF WASHDC 0000
USDOE WASHDC 0000
DOT WASHDC
DIRNSA MD
NSC WASHDC 0000
TREASURY DEPT WASHDC 0000

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TO DCM/PO AND CONSULAR SECTION CHIEF

E.O. 12958: N/A

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN S BLODGETT
DATE/CASE ID: 23 OCT 2006 200602966

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TAGS: KVPR, CVIS, PTER, ASEC, CMGT, PINR, PREL
SUBJECT: FIGHTING TERRORISM: VISAS VIPER PROCEDURES

REFS: (A) 00 STATE 042833, (B) STATE 083622

SUMMARY

1. THIS VISAS VIPER PROCEDURAL MESSAGE IS SENT IN LIGHT OF THE HEINOUS TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 ON THE WORLD TRADE CENTER AND PENTAGON. THE VISAS VIPER PROGRAM PROVIDES UNIQUE BENEFITS TO THE DEPARTMENT AND NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. THE SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE VISAS VIPER PROGRAM IS IN PART DEPENDENT ON SUBMISSIONS FROM EMBASSIES AND CONSULATES AROUND THE WORLD. THIS CABLE SERVES AS A REMINDER OF THE PROGRAM'S IMPORTANCE AND IS A CALL TO CONTINUED VIGILANCE.

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2. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES DETAILED GUIDANCE ON VISAS VIPER POLICY AND PROCEDURES. WHILE THERE ARE NO SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES FROM THE CURRENT GUIDANCE (REF A) A PROGRAM REMINDER WAS DEEMED NECESSARY AT THIS TIME. THESE INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD BE KEPT ON FILE FOR REFERENCE BY POST MANAGEMENT, VISAS VIPER COORDINATORS, AND OTHER APPROPRIATE OFFICERS.

3. POSTS ARE ASKED TO ENSURE THAT ALL MISSION SECTIONS AND AGENCIES ARE MADE AWARE OF THIS GUIDANCE, TO EXAMINE THEIR ADMINISTRATION OF THE VISAS VIPER PROGRAM IN LIGHT OF IT, AND TO TAKE WHATEVER STEPS ARE NEEDED TO RESOLVE ANY INCONSISTENCIES. NO REPORT TO THE DEPARTMENT IS REQUIRED ON THE RESULTS OF THIS INTERNAL REVIEW.

THE "VISAS VIPER" TERRORIST REPORTING PROGRAM:
BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE

4. THE VISAS VIPER PROGRAM ORIGINATED IN RESPONSE TO THE 1993 WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING AND OTHER THREATS AND INCIDENTS OF TERRORISM INVOLVING FOREIGN NATIONALS. AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE WTC BOMBING REVEALED DEFICIENCIES IN THE WAY AVAILABLE INFORMATION ON TERRORISTS WAS BEING SHARED AT OVERSEAS POSTS AND REPORTED TO THE DEPARTMENT. SPECIFICALLY LACKING WAS A MECHANISM FOR ROUTINELY AND CONSISTENTLY BRINGING SUSPECTED TERRORISTS TO THE CONSULAR SECTION'S ATTENTION FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENTERING THEIR NAMES INTO THE DEPARTMENT'S "CONSULAR LOOKOUT AND SUPPORT SYSTEM"

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(CLASS) AND THE INS/US CUSTOMS SERVICE'S "INTERAGENCY
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BORDER INSPECTION SYSTEM" (IBIS). THE VISAS VIPER PROGRAM
WAS CREATED TO ADDRESS THIS CONCERN. ITS MISSION IS TO:

- (1) UTILIZE THE COOPERATIVE RESOURCES OF ALL ELEMENTS OF
FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS TO IDENTIFY POTENTIAL TERRORISTS;
- (2) DEVELOP INFORMATION ON SUCH INDIVIDUALS;
- (3) PROVIDE A DIRECT CONSULAR CHANNEL FOR REPORTING THIS
INFORMATION; AND
- (4) WATCHLIST THE SUBJECTS IN CLASS AND IBIS TO ENSURE THEY
ARE APPROPRIATELY SCREENED SHOULD THEY LATER APPLY FOR
VISAS OR FOR ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES.

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SCOPE OF THE PROGRAM:
LIMITED TO NON-VISA APPLICANTS

6. THE VISAS VIPER PROGRAM IS INTENDED SOLELY FOR REPORTING
ON ALIENS WHO ARE NOT CURRENTLY APPLYING FOR U.S. VISAS.
VISA APPLICANTS WHO ARE SUSPECTED OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY
CONTINUE TO BE SUBJECT TO THE VISAS DONKEY OR VISAS BEAR
SECURITY ADVISORY OPINION REQUIREMENT (SEE PARAGRAPH 7
BELOW).

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LIMITED TO TERRORISTS

7. THE VIPER CHANNEL IS FURTHER LIMITED TO ALIENS WHO ARE KNOWN OR POTENTIAL TERRORISTS. IT SHOULD NOT BE USED TO REPORT ON NARCOTRAFFICKERS OR OTHER MALEFACTORS UNLESS THEY ARE ALSO SUSPECTED OF FALLING WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF INA 212(A)(3)(B). MEMBERS OF ORGANIZED CRIME GROUPS ORIGINATING IN THE INDEPENDENT STATES THAT ONCE COMPOSED THE SOVIET UNION AND IN THE BALTIC REPUBLICS SHOULD BE REPORTED THROUGH THE VISAS SHARK PROGRAM (SEE REF B). (NB: AN ALIEN WHO IS NOT A CURRENT VISA APPLICANT, BUT WHOM A CONSULAR OFFICER SUSPECTS OF INVOLVEMENT IN EXCLUSIONARY CRIMINAL OR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING ACTIVITY, MAY BE ENTERED

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DIRECTLY INTO CLASS BY THE CONSULAR POST USING THE
APPROPRIATE QUASI REFUSAL CODE (SEE 9 FAM PART IV APPENDIX
D, EXHIBIT I)).

DISTINCTION BETWEEN "VISAS VIPER" AND "VISAS DONKEY/BEAR"

8. THE VISAS VIPER REPORTING PROGRAM COMPLEMENTS THE VISAS DONKEY AND VISAS BEAR SECURITY ADVISORY OPINION (SAO) PROCEDURES. VISAS VIPER TELEGRAMS REPORT ON POSSIBLE

TERRORISTS WHO ARE NOT CURRENT VISA APPLICANTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF WATCHLISTING THEM, WHILE VISAS DONKEY AND VISAS BEAR CABLES ARE USED TO REQUEST SAO'S ON SUCH INDIVIDUALS WHEN THEY APPLY FOR VISAS. POSTS MUST USE WHICHEVER PROCEDURE IS APPROPRIATE TO BRING ALL TERRORISTS ON WHOM THEY HAVE INFORMATION TO THE DEPARTMENT'S ATTENTION.

VVP ADMINISTRATION WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT

9. IN THE DEPARTMENT, THE VISAS VIPER PROGRAM IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF "TIPOFF", A PROGRAM ADMINISTERED BY THE BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH (INR) THAT COORDINATES THE DEPARTMENT'S USE OF INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF WATCHLISTING TERRORISTS. TIPOFF MAINTAINS A COUNTERTERRORISM DATABASE NOW NUMBERING OVER 64,000 NAMES, OF WHICH MORE THAN 22,000 WERE CONTRIBUTED THROUGH THE VISAS VIPER CHANNEL. THE TIPOFF/VIPER STAFF, IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH THE VISA OFFICE'S COORDINATION DIVISION (CA/VO/L/C), DEVELOPS VISAS VIPER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES,

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CREATES AND UPDATES TIPOFF RECORDS, AND DETERMINES WHETHER
THE NAMES OF INDIVIDUAL SUSPECTED TERRORISTS ARE ENTERED
INTO CLASS AND IBIS [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] IT PROVIDES FEEDBACK AND GUIDANCE
TO FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS ON VISAS VIPER REPORTING AND
SERVES AS LIAISON WITH INTERESTED OFFICES IN THE DEPARTMENT
AND WITH THE HEADQUARTERS OF OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ON
MATTERS RELATING TO THE PROGRAM. ALL COMMUNICATIONS TO THE
TIPOFF/VIPER STAFF SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO INR/TIPOFF.

DEPARTMENT'S VISAS VIPER COORDINATOR

10. THE DEPARTMENT'S VISAS VIPER COORDINATOR IS [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] IS LOCATED AT INR/TIPOFF, ROOM 6510,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON D.C. 20520. HIS NAME IS IN
THE DEPARTMENT'S CLASSIFIED AND UNCLASSIFIED E-MAIL
SYSTEMS. HE CAN BE REACHED TELEPHONICALLY AT [REDACTED]
AND HIS FAX NUMBERS ARE: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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VVP ADMINISTRATION AT FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS

11. THE VVP IS PRIMARILY ADMINISTERED AT OVERSEAS POSTS
THROUGH A VISAS VIPER COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED AT EACH POST,
CHAIRIED BY THE DCM OR PRINCIPAL OFFICER AND COMPOSED OF
REPRESENTATIVES FROM APPROPRIATE POST ENTITIES. ALL
SECTIONS AND AGENCIES INVOLVED IN SECURITY, LAW
ENFORCEMENT, AND INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ARE STRONGLY
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ENCOURAGED TO PARTICIPATE, AS SHOULD THOSE HAVING OFFICIAL
AND/OR PUBLIC CONTACTS WHICH MAY PRODUCE TERRORISM-RELATED
INFORMATION. THE VISAS VIPER COMMITTEES SHOULD MEET AT
LEAST QUARTERLY TO SHARE INFORMATION ON KNOWN OR SUSPECTED
TERRORISTS AND TO DETERMINE WHETHER SUCH INFORMATION MEETS
THE CRITERIA FOR VISAS VIPER REPORTING (SEE PARAGRAPH 17
BELOW). A REPORT SUMMARIZING THE RESULTS OF THE COMMITTEE
MEETING(S) HELD DURING EACH QUARTER, AS WELL AS OTHER POST
VVP ACTIVITY, IS REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
INSTRUCTIONS IN PARAGRAPHS 14 THROUGH 16 BELOW. WHILE
VISAS VIPER COMMITTEE MEETINGS ARE THE PRINCIPAL FORUMS FOR
SHARING TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE AT POST, INFORMATION
DEVELOPED ON AN AD HOC BASIS, PARTICULARLY THAT OF AN
URGENT NATURE, MUST ALSO BE CONSIDERED FOR EXPEDITIOUS
REPORTING THROUGH THE VISAS VIPER CHANNEL.

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DESIGNATION OF POST VVP COORDINATORS

12. POSTS ARE STRONGLY ENCOURAGED TO DESIGNATE A VISAS VIPER COORDINATOR, NORMALLY THE CONSULAR SECTION CHIEF OR AN OFFICER RESPONSIBLE TO HIM OR HER, WHO WOULD SERVE THE FOLLOWING FUNCTIONS:

(1) LIAISON WITH OTHER SECTIONS AND AGENCIES (PROVIDE INFORMATION AND ADVICE ON VVP POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, ENSURE THAT STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS USE THE VISAS VIPER CHANNEL WHEN REPORTING ON TERRORISTS, AND PROMOTE AWARENESS AND UTILIZATION OF THE VIPER CHANNEL AMONG OTHER-AGENCY REPRESENTATIVES);

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(2) COORDINATION OF VIPER COMMITTEE MEETINGS (ASSIST THE DCM/PO IN SCHEDULING THE MANDATORY QUARTERLY MEETINGS AND ARRANGE APPROPRIATE STATE DEPARTMENT AND OTHER-AGENCY PARTICIPATION);

(3) OVERSIGHT OF VISAS VIPER REPORTING (PREPARE REQUIRED QUARTERLY REPORTS ON POST'S VVP ACTIVITIES AND MONITOR AD HOC REPORTING ON INDIVIDUAL TERRORISTS); AND

(4) LIAISON WITH THE DEPARTMENT (MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE DEPARTMENT'S VISAS VIPER COORDINATOR, SEEK GUIDANCE ON QUESTIONS REGARDING VVP ISSUES, AND RESPOND TO THE DEPARTMENT'S REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON VIPER CASES).

13. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THIS IS AN EXCELLENT LEADERSHIP OPPORTUNITY FOR THE DESIGNATED OFFICER, PROVIDING RESPONSIBILITY FOR COORDINATING A VITAL ISSUE WITH ALL ELEMENTS OF THE MISSION.

QUARTERLY REPORTING REQUIREMENT:
MANDATE AND CONTENTS

14. POSTS ARE REQUIRED TO SUBMIT MANDATORY QUARTERLY REPORTS OUTLINING THEIR VISAS VIPER PROGRAM ACTIVITIES DURING EACH PERIOD. SUCH REPORTS SHOULD CONTAIN THE DATE(S) VVP COMMITTEE MEETINGS WERE HELD, THE NUMBER OF VIPER TELEGRAMS SUBMITTED, AND A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF ANY QUESTIONS OR COMMENTS THE POST MAY HAVE REGARDING THE

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PROGRAM'S POLICIES AND PROCEDURES. THESE MANDATORY REPORTS

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MUST BE SUBMITTED EVEN IF NO INFORMATION ON TERRORISTS WAS DEVELOPED DURING THE QUARTER. THE QUARTERLY REPORT REQUIREMENT WAS INSTITUTED UPON THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL TO IMPROVE THE PARTICIPATION OF FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS IN THE VISAS VIPER PROGRAM. THE OIG'S CLOSE ATTENTION TO THE VVP REFLECTS THE PROGRAM'S KEY ROLE IN THE DEPARTMENT'S COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS. THE VISAS VIPER STAFF ROUTINELY REPORTS TO THE OIG ON POSTS REPORTING STATUS.

QUARTERLY REPORT PROCEDURES

15. VVP FISCAL YEAR QUARTERLY REPORTS ARE DUE NO LATER THAN 15 DAYS FOLLOWING THE END OF EACH QUARTER, I.E., BY THE 15TH OF JANUARY, APRIL, JULY, AND OCTOBER. THE QUARTER REPORTED UPON SHOULD BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED IN THE SUBJECT LINE: E.G. "VISAS VIPER: FY-01 2ND QUARTER REPORT". THE REPORTS SHOULD BE SLUGGED FOR INR/TIPOFF AND CA/VO/L/C AND USE THE FOLLOWING TAGS: KVPR, CVIS, CMGT, PINR, PTER, ASEC.

SUBMITTING QUARTERLY REPORTS FOR OTHER POSTS

16. THE DEPARTMENT IS AWARE THAT SOME POSTS ARE CONSULTING WITH AND SUBMITTING QUARTERLY REPORTS ON BEHALF OF CONSTITUENT AND/OR NON VISA-ISSUING POSTS WITHIN THEIR HOST COUNTRIES. IN SUCH CASES, THE REPORTING POSTS SHOULD BE CERTAIN TO INDICATE CLEARLY IN THEIR QUARTERLY REPORTS THE
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POSTS WITH WHICH THEY HAVE CONSULTED ON VISAS VIPER
ACTIVITIES AND ON WHOSE BEHALF THEY ARE REPORTING.

VISAS VIPER REPORTING CRITERIA

17. A VISAS VIPER CABLE MUST BE SUBMITTED IF:

(1) THERE IS REASON TO SUSPECT THAT AN INDIVIDUAL FALLS WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF INA 212 (A) (3) (B); AND

(2) THERE IS SUFFICIENT BIOGRAPHIC DATA TO POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE SUBJECT OF THE INFORMATION.

18. THE PRIMARY GOAL OF THE VISAS VIPER PROGRAM IS TO DEVELOP HIGH-QUALITY, USABLE RECORDS ON POSSIBLE TERRORISTS, NOT MERELY TO COLLECT IMPRESSIVE STATISTICS. A VISAS VIPER TELEGRAM SHOULD THEREFORE ONLY BE SENT IF BOTH

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OF THE ABOVE CRITERIA ARE MET.

REASON TO SUSPECT TERRORIST ACTIVITY

19. THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN A VISAS VIPER TELEGRAM MUST BE SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT THE INDIVIDUAL IS SUBJECT TO INA 212(A) (3) (B): I.E., THAT HE OR SHE:

(1) HAS ENGAGED, IS ENGAGED, OR IS LIKELY TO ENGAGE IN
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TERRORIST ACTIVITY AS DEFINED IN THAT SECTION;

(2) HAS INCITED TERRORIST ACTIVITY WITH INTENT TO CAUSE DEATH OR BODILY HARM; OR

(3) IS A KNOWING MEMBER OR A REPRESENTATIVE OF ONE OF THE 28 TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS CURRENTLY DESIGNATED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE PURSUANT TO SEC. 302 OF P.L. 104-132. A COMPLETE LIST OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR ALIASES WILL BE PROVIDED SEPTEL.

20. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE "REASONABLE SUSPICION" CRITERION FOR SUBMITTING VISAS VIPER CABLES REPRESENTS A LESSER STANDARD THAN THE "REASON TO BELIEVE" STANDARD REQUIRED TO SUPPORT VISA DENIAL UNDER INA 212(A) (3) (B). THE DEPARTMENT CONSIDERS THE "REASONABLE SUSPICION" CRITERION TO BE MET IF THE DEROGATORY INFORMATION CURRENTLY AVAILABLE WOULD WARRANT FURTHER DETAILED INQUIRY INTO THE SUBJECT'S BACKGROUND SHOULD HE OR SHE APPLY FOR A VISA. AN INDIVIDUAL'S ASSOCIATION WITH KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TERRORISTS OR TERRORIST GROUPS ALSO MEETS THE CRITERION IF SUCH ASSOCIATION SUGGESTS A PROSCRIBED MEMBERSHIP OR PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORIST ACTS.

IDENTIFICATION OF SUBJECT

21. IT IS ESSENTIAL TO DEVELOP AND REPORT ALL AVAILABLE IDENTIFYING DATA ON THE SUBJECTS OF VISAS VIPER TELEGRAMS. DEROGATORY INFORMATION ON A SUSPECTED TERRORIST, REGARDLESS
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OF ITS GRAVITY, IS OF LITTLE VALUE UNLESS IT CAN BE LINKED TO THAT INDIVIDUAL SHOULD HE OR SHE APPLY FOR A VISA OR FOR ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES. INSUFFICIENT BIOGRAPHIC DATA

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IN A GIVEN CASE CAN RESULT IN A FAILURE TO IDENTIFY A SERIOUS THREAT TO U.S. SECURITY. IT CAN ALSO PRODUCE "FALSE HITS" THAT COMPLICATE VISA ADJUDICATION AND CAUSE UNWARRANTED INCONVENIENCE TO BONA FIDE VISA APPLICANTS. FOR THESE REASONS, THE DEPARTMENT CAREFULLY WEIGHS THE ADEQUACY OF BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION WHEN DETERMINING WHETHER TO CREATE TIPOFF RECORDS AND CLASS/IBIS ENTRIES ON THE SUBJECTS OF VISAS VIPER REPORTING. IT SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT EVEN WHEN CLASS AND IBIS ENTRIES ARE NOT MADE BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT BIOGRAPHIC DATA, TIPOFF RECORDS ARE OFTEN CREATED ON THE SUBJECT IN CASE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS LATER DEVELOPED.

22. VISAS VIPER TELEGRAMS SHOULD IDEALLY PROVIDE FULL NAMES (INCLUDING ALIASES AND ALTERNATE SPELLINGS) AND DATES AND PLACES OF BIRTH. SINCE NAMING CONVENTIONS VARY BY COUNTRY AND REGION, THE SUBJECT'S SURNAME(S) MUST BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED, EITHER BY LISTING IT/THEM FIRST, FOLLOWED BY A COMMA AND THE GIVEN NAME(S), OR BY PLACING THE SURNAME(S) IN PARENTHESES. IN CASES WHERE THE SUBJECT'S GIVEN NAME CAN BE EITHER MASCULINE OR FEMININE, THE SUBJECT'S GENDER SHOULD BE SPECIFIED.

23. IF AN INDIVIDUAL'S EXACT DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH ARE NOT AVAILABLE, A REASONABLE ESTIMATE OF HIS OR HER AGE AND

THE KNOWN OR PROBABLE COUNTRY OF BIRTH SHOULD BE PROVIDED IF POSSIBLE. VISAS VIPER TELEGRAMS MAY BE SUBMITTED

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WITHOUT BIRTH DATA IF THE SUBJECT'S NAME IS NOT A COMMON ONE, AND IF THE POST IS ABLE TO PROVIDE OTHER IDENTIFYING INFORMATION. PERSONAL DETAILS SUCH AS PASSPORT DATA, PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS, EDUCATION, PROFESSION, RESIDENTIAL AND EMPLOYMENT HISTORY, AND THE NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS ARE OFTEN USEFUL IN ESTABLISHING IDENTITY. A SUBJECT'S AFFILIATION WITH A TERRORIST GROUP, AND HIS OR HER POSITION THEREIN, SHOULD ALWAYS BE REPORTED AS THIS INFORMATION IS PARTICULARLY VALUABLE FOR BOTH IDENTIFICATION AND THREAT ASSESSMENT PURPOSES.

24. PLEASE NOTE THAT A YEAR OF BIRTH, AT A MINIMUM, IS REQUIRED TO ENTER A SUBJECT'S NAME INTO THE INS/U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE'S IBIS LOOKOUT SYSTEM. IT IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO KEEP THIS IN MIND WHEN REPORTING ON NATIONALS OF VISA WAIVER COUNTRIES SINCE THE ONLY SCREENING OF SUCH INDIVIDUALS IS THROUGH IBIS AT U.S. PORTS-OF-ENTRY.

PRIORITIZING AND EVALUATING TERRORIST INFORMATION:

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PRIORITIES FOR TERRORIST REPORTING

25. WHILE ALL SUSPECTED TERRORISTS MEETING THE VISAS VIPER CRITERIA MUST BE REPORTED, POSTS SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THE FOLLOWING PRIORITIES WHEN GATHERING AND EVALUATING TERRORIST INFORMATION. THESE PRIORITIES, RANKED IN DESCENDING ORDER OF THREAT, WERE DEVELOPED IN CONSULTATION WITH OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES:

- (1) INDIVIDUALS WHO POSE OR MAY POSE A PRESENT THREAT TO
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U.S. INTERESTS IN THE UNITED STATES OR ABROAD;

- (2) INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE NOT NOW KNOWN TO POSE A PRESENT THREAT TO U.S. INTERESTS, BUT WHO HAVE DONE SO WITHIN THE PAST 15 YEARS; AND

- (3) INDIVIDUALS WHO POSE A PRESENT THREAT TO NON-U.S. INTERESTS, OR WHO DID SO WITHIN THE PAST TEN YEARS.

EVALUATION OF TERRORIST INFORMATION

26. THE FOLLOWING ARE AMONG MANY FACTORS THAT MUST BE CONSIDERED WHEN EVALUATING TERRORIST INFORMATION AND/OR ASSESSING ITS URGENCY:

- (1) THE IMMEDIACY AND SEVERITY OF THE THREAT POSED;
- (2) THE RELIABILITY OF THE INFORMATION;
- (3) WHETHER THE SUBJECT IS CLEARLY IDENTIFIED; AND
- (4) WHETHER ADDITIONAL INFORMATION COULD BE DEVELOPED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME PERIOD TO FURTHER CLARIFY THE SITUATION OR BETTER IDENTIFY THE SUBJECT.

27. EVALUATING TERRORIST INFORMATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF SUBMITTING VISAS VIPER REPORTING REQUIRES FLEXIBILITY AND SUBJECTIVE JUDGMENT FOR WHICH THERE ARE NOT ALWAYS CLEAR GUIDELINES. THE DEPARTMENT BELIEVES THAT SUCH ASSESSMENTS ARE BEST MADE BY EACH POST'S VISAS VIPER COMMITTEE, WHICH
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HAS FIRST-HAND KNOWLEDGE OF THE HOST COUNTRY'S TERRORIST THREAT SITUATION. IF THE POST BELIEVES THE REPORTING CRITERIA OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 16 ABOVE HAVE BEEN MET, A VISAS VIPER TELEGRAM PROVIDING ALL KNOWN INFORMATION SHOULD

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BE SUBMITTED. THE DEPARTMENT ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTION TAKEN ONCE INFORMATION ON POTENTIAL TERRORISTS IS REPORTED.

VISAS VIPER REPORTING CHANNEL

28. COUNTERTERRORISM REPORTING IS NOW, MORE THAN EVER, AN IMPORTANT FOREIGN POLICY FUNCTION REQUIRING THE COLLABORATIVE EFFORT OF ALL MEMBERS OF A POST'S COUNTRY TEAM. EXCEPT IN THE RARE INSTANCES WHERE THERE ARE SPECIAL OPERATIONAL CONCERNS, ALL STATE DEPARTMENT REPORTING ON TERRORISTS, INCLUDING DIPLOMATIC SECURITY (DS) REPORTING, MUST BE TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE VISAS VIPER CHANNEL. OTHER-AGENCY TERRORIST REPORTING MAY USE THE VIPER CHANNEL OR BE SENT THROUGH THE AGENCY'S TRADITIONAL REPORTING CHANNEL. REGARDLESS OF THE MEANS OF TRANSMISSION CHOSEN, IT IS ESSENTIAL TO ENSURE THAT SUSPECTED TERRORISTS ARE SCREENED FOR POSSIBLE INCLUSION IN THE CLASS AND IBIS LOOKOUT SYSTEMS.

DEPARTMENTAL REPORTING

29. THE VISAS VIPER CHANNEL OFFERS A DIRECT CONSULAR CONDUIT FOR WATCHLISTING KNOWN AND SUSPECTED TERRORISTS AND
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MUST BE USED FOR ALL DEPARTMENTAL REPORTING ON INDIVIDUALS WHO MEET THE VIPER PROGRAM'S SCOPE AND CRITERIA. INFORMATION ON TERRORISTS MAY ORIGINATE FROM A VARIETY OF SOURCES INCLUDING CONSULAR INTERVIEWS, MEDIA REPORTING, AND THE CONTACTS OF THE SECURITY OFFICER AND OTHER POST SECTIONS AND AGENCIES. THE FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE (FBIS), IF AVAILABLE AT POST, IS A VALUABLE RESOURCE. TERRORIST INFORMATION MAY BE DEVELOPED AND SHARED THROUGH EITHER THE POST'S INTERAGENCY VISAS VIPER COMMITTEE OR ON AN AD HOC BASIS. WHILE THE CONSULAR SECTION HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR COORDINATING AND MONITORING VISAS VIPER REPORTING, OTHER DEPARTMENT SECTIONS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR SHARING TERRORIST INFORMATION WITH THE CONSULAR SECTION, AND, IF DRAFTING REPORTS ON TERRORISTS, FOR ENSURING THAT SUCH REPORTING IS TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE VISAS VIPER CHANNEL. (FOR GUIDANCE ON PREPARING VISAS VIPER TELEGRAMS, SEE PARAGRAPHS 31 THROUGH 34 BELOW).

OTHER AGENCY REPORTING

30. THE VISAS VIPER CHANNEL IS INTENDED TO SUPPLEMENT, RATHER THAN SUPPLANT, PREVIOUSLY EXISTING CHANNELS USED BY

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OTHER AGENCIES FOR REPORTING ON FOREIGN TERRORISTS. OTHER AGENCIES MAY SHARE TERRORIST INFORMATION WITH THE POST'S VISAS VIPER COMMITTEE FOR TRANSMISSION TO THE DEPARTMENT THROUGH THE VIPER CHANNEL, OR MAY CHOOSE TO SEND IT DIRECTLY TO THEIR HEADQUARTERS. DATA TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE LATTER ROUTE IS USUALLY LATER PASSED TO THE DEPARTMENT FOR POSSIBLE CLASS AND IBIS ENTRY THROUGH THE TIPOFF

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PROGRAM. OTHER-AGENCY DRAFTERS CAN DIRECT TERRORIST REPORTING TO THE TIPOFF/VIPER STAFF'S ATTENTION, AND EXPEDITE ITS RECEIPT, BY INCLUDING THE PHRASE "RECOMMENDED FOR CONSIDERATION IN THE VISAS VIPER PROGRAM" IN THE TEXT OF THE OUTGOING MESSAGES. ORIGINATING AGENCIES MAY PREFER TO USE THEIR OWN REPORTING CHANNELS FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, INCLUDING THE PROTECTION OF SOURCES AND ONGOING OPERATIONS. HOWEVER, ALL POST AGENCIES SHOULD BE MADE AWARE OF THE AVAILABILITY OF THE VISAS VIPER CHANNEL AS A DIRECT AND EXPEDITIOUS MEANS OF WATCHLISTING SUSPECTED TERRORISTS IN THE BORDER SECURITY LOOKOUT SYSTEMS (CLASS AND IBIS), AND SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO USE IT IN APPROPRIATE CIRCUMSTANCES.

VISAS VIPER REPORTING PROCEDURES:
REQUIREMENTS

31. THE DEPARTMENT'S OBJECTIVE IS TO FACILITATE VISAS VIPER REPORTING TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE CONSISTENT WITH MEETING THE FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS:

- (1) THAT ALL AVAILABLE IDENTIFYING AND DEROGATORY INFORMATION BE PROVIDED; AND
- (2) THAT THE REPORTS RECEIVE THE DISTRIBUTION NECESSARY FOR ALERTING INTERESTED AGENCIES AND FOR WATCHLISTING THE SUBJECTS.

PREPARING VIPER TELEGRAMS

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32. VISAS VIPER CABLES SHOULD BE SLUGGED FOR INR/TIPOFF AND CA/VO/L/C AND MUST BE ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING AGENCIES: "SECSTATE WASHDC, DIRFBI//INTD/CTS//, INS/HQINT WASHDC, US CUSTOMS SERVICE WASHDC/INTEL". OTHER POSTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT'S PLACE OF NATIONALITY OR RESIDENCE, OR OVER THE AREA IN WHICH THE SUBJECT, OR THE SUBJECT'S GROUP, HAS BEEN ACTIVE SHOULD NORMALLY BE

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INCLUDED AS INFO ADDRESSEES. THE VISAS VIPER CODE INDICATOR SHOULD APPEAR IN THE CAPTION LINE OF THE TELEGRAM, AND THE FOLLOWING TAGS SHOULD BE USED: KVPR, PTER, CVIS, PINR, ASEC, (COUNTRY TAG). VISAS VIPER TELEGRAMS SHOULD IDEALLY BE PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MODEL FORMAT PROVIDED IN 9 FAM PART IV APPENDIX E, SECTION 302, ALTHOUGH FLEXIBILITY IS PERMITTED (SEE PARAGRAPH 34 BELOW). AT POSTS' DISCRETION, MULTIPLE NAMES MAY BE SUBMITTED IN A SINGLE TELEGRAM. THE CABLE SHOULD PROVIDE ALL IDENTIFYING DATA AVAILABLE REGARDING THE SUBJECT(S) AS WELL AS A DETAILED RECITATION OF THE DEROGATORY INFORMATION KNOWN TO POST, INCLUDING THE IDENTIFICATION OF ANY TERRORIST GROUPS WITH WHICH THE SUBJECT MAY BE AFFILIATED. FINALLY, VISAS VIPER TELEGRAMS SHOULD INCLUDE AN EVALUATION OF THE CREDIBILITY AND APPLICABILITY OF THE INFORMATION SUBMITTED, A GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE SOURCE, AND AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SOURCE'S RELIABILITY.

CLASSIFICATION AND HANDLING

33. VISAS VIPER CABLES SHOULD, OF COURSE, BE CLASSIFIED AT UNCLASSIFIED

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AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL AND ASSIGNED APPROPRIATE TELEGRAPHIC PRECEDENCE. IN A CLASSIFIED VIPER TELEGRAM, THE PORTION CONTAINING THE SUBJECT'S NAME, DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH, NATIONALITY, AND PASSPORT NUMBER SHOULD REMAIN UNCLASSIFIED SINCE THESE DATA ELEMENTS WILL LIKELY BE ENTERED INTO THE UNCLASSIFIED CLASS AND IBIS LOOKOUT SYSTEMS. ALL OTHER INFORMATION PROVIDED IS MAINTAINED BY THE DEPARTMENT AND PROTECTED ACCORDING TO ITS CLASSIFICATION. THE USE OF THE ROGER CHANNEL SHOULD BE AVOIDED WHEN SENDING VISAS VIPER CABLES, SINCE TELEGRAMS SO TRANSMITTED REQUIRE SPECIAL HANDLING THAT RESULTS IN PROCESSING DELAYS.

DUAL PURPOSE REPORTING

34. THE DEPARTMENT RECOGNIZES THAT COUNTERTERRORISM REPORTING, PARTICULARLY THAT INITIATED BY OTHER SECTIONS OR AGENCIES, OFTEN HAS PURPOSES OTHER THAN, OR IN ADDITION TO, WATCHLISTING THE INDIVIDUAL IN QUESTION. FOR THIS REASON, AND TO OBTAIN THE NEED FOR DUPLICATE REPORTING, POSTS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO PRECISELY FOLLOW THE MODEL FORMAT SHOWN IN 9 FAM PART IV APPENDIX E, SECTION 302. AS LONG AS THE TELEGRAM CONTAINS THE "KVPR" TAG AND THE "VISAS VIPER" CODE INDICATOR, INCLUDES THE ADDRESSEES LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 32 ABOVE, AND PROVIDES COMPLETE INFORMATION REGARDING THE

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SUSPECTED TERRORIST'S IDENTITY AND ACTIVITIES, IT WILL
RECEIVE APPROPRIATE DISTRIBUTION AND BE PROCESSED BY THE
TIPOFF/VIPER STAFF.

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WATCHLISTING TERRORISTS

35. THE SUBJECTS OF VISAS VIPER REPORTING WHO MEET THE
PROGRAM'S CRITERIA ARE ENTERED INTO TIPOFF'S
COUNTERTERRORISM DATABASE AND THEIR NAMES ARE INCLUDED IN
CLASS UNDER THE DPT-00 CODE. AS WITH ALL DPT-00 ENTRIES,
THE DEPARTMENT'S SECURITY ADVISORY OPINION IS REQUIRED
SHOULD A SUBJECT LATER APPLY FOR A VISA, AND NO VISA MAY BE
ISSUED UNTIL THE DEPARTMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE SAO REQUEST
IS RECEIVED. THE NAMES OF MOST INDIVIDUALS WHOSE DATES OF
BIRTH ARE KNOWN ARE ALSO ENTERED INTO THE INS/U.S. CUSTOMS
SERVICE'S IBIS LOOKOUT SYSTEM [REDACTED]

B2

[REDACTED] AS
INDICATED IN PARAGRAPH 24 ABOVE, AT LEAST THE SUBJECT'S

YEAR OF BIRTH IS NEEDED TO CREATE AN IBIS ENTRY, MAKING THE
PROVISION OF THIS INFORMATION PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT WHEN
SUBMITTING VIPER CABLES ON NATIONALS OF VISA WAIVER
COUNTRIES.

CLASS ENTRY BY POSTS IN CERTAIN CASES

36. WHEN A CONSULAR OFFICER BELIEVES THAT A SUSPECTED
TERRORIST SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN CLASS IMMEDIATELY, THE
CONSULAR OFFICER SHOULD ENTER THE SUBJECT'S NAME DIRECTLY
USING THE APPROPRIATE QUASI 212 (A) (3) (B) REFUSAL CODE (SEE
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9 FAM PART IV APPENDIX D, EXHIBIT I). CIRCUMSTANCES
REQUIRING SUCH ACTION INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO, A
CREDIBLE IMMINENT THREAT TO UNITED STATES INTERESTS OR AN
IMPENDING APPLICATION FOR A U.S. VISA BY THE SUBJECT. THE
CONSULAR OFFICER MUST THEN EXPEDITIOUSLY SUBMIT A VISAS
VIPER TELEGRAM, IN WHICH THE POST'S CLASS ENTRY SHOULD BE
REPORTED.

CONDUCTING CLASS CHECKS

37. PRIOR TO SUBMITTING A VISAS VIPER TELEGRAM ON A

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POTENTIAL TERRORIST, CONSULAR POSTS MUST CONDUCT A CLASS CHECK TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE SUBJECT WAS PREVIOUSLY INCLUDED AS A DPT-00 ENTRY OR UNDER ANOTHER CODE REQUIRING A SECURITY ADVISORY OPINION. THE VISAS VIPER TELEGRAM SHOULD BE SUBMITTED EVEN IF THE CLASS CHECK REVEALS A PREVIOUS ENTRY SINCE THE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO POST IS LIKELY TO ADD TO THE SUBJECT'S EXISTING RECORD. THE RESULTS OF THE CLASS CHECK SHOULD BE REPORTED IN THE VIPER CABLE. ANY CLASS ENTRIES MUST BE FULLY CITED SO THAT THE SUBJECT MAY BE ACCURATELY IDENTIFIED AND HIS/HER RECORD EXPEDITIOUSLY LOCATED.

REMOVING VVP CLASS AND IBIS ENTRIES

38. RECOMMENDATIONS TO DELETE CLASS AND IBIS ENTRIES THAT WERE BASED UPON VISAS VIPER REPORTING SHOULD BE SUBMITTED
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TO THE DEPARTMENT SLUGGED FOR INR/TIPOFF AND CA/VO/L/C.
THE CABLE SHOULD CONTAIN THE "VISAS VIPER" CODE INDICATOR
AND THE "KVPR" TAG. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE DELETION REQUEST
MUST BE PROVIDED. CIRCUMSTANCES CREATING THE NEED FOR SUCH

A RECOMMENDATION MIGHT INCLUDE THE SUBJECT'S DEMISE OR THE DEVELOPMENT OF EVIDENCE THAT THE DEROGATORY INFORMATION AGAINST THE SUBJECT, PREVIOUSLY BELIEVED CREDIBLE, IS WITHOUT FOUNDATION.

DEPARTMENT FEEDBACK

39. THE DEPARTMENT WILL REPLY IN A TIMELY MANNER TO ALL VISAS VIPER COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ROUTINE QUARTERLY REPORTS. IN INDIVIDUAL CASES, THE DEPARTMENT WILL INFORM POSTS REGARDING THE WATCHLISTING OF THE SUBJECT(S) AND WILL ADVISE IF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS NEEDED. POSTS' INQUIRIES REGARDING VISAS VIPER POLICIES AND PROCEDURES WILL ALSO RECEIVE THE DEPARTMENT'S PROMPT ATTENTION. THE DEPARTMENT WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO PROVIDE COMPREHENSIVE GUIDANCE AND FEEDBACK ON VISAS VIPER MATTERS AND TO FORM A TRUE PARTNERSHIP WITH FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS IN FULFILLING THIS CRUCIAL COUNTERTERRORISM RESPONSIBILITY.

40. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
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ACTION VO-03

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AF-00	AID-00	ACQ-00	CA-01	COME-00
	INL-00	DODE-00	DOTE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-00
	E-00	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00	LAB-01
	NEA-00	DCP-01	NSAE-00	OES-01	SCT-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	IIP-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/010W					

-----6E102E 011711Z /38

O 011703Z MAR 02
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4590
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU PRIORITY
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D), B7(A)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 001054

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6 (X1, X5, X6)
TAGS: KVPR, PINR, PINS, PTER, ETRD, BE, XA
SUBJECT: ANTWERP LINKS TO SHIITE TERRORISTS AND CONFLICT
DIAMONDS:SAMIH OSSAILY AND HIS CIRCLE

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PAGE 02 BRUSSE 01054 01 OF 04 011711Z
REF: 2001 BRUSSELS 5885

CLASSIFIED BY: ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR STEVEN A. CANDY. REASONS 1.5
(B. AND D)

SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION

1. (C/NF). THIS MESSAGE SEEKS TO CONTRIBUTE TO FILLING IN
GAPS IN OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONFLICT-DIAMOND WORLD IN
ANTWERP, INCLUDING ITS TIES TO TERRORISM. SAMIH OSSAILY'S
NAME CAME TO WORLD ATTENTION NOVEMBER 2, 2001, WHEN AN
ARTICLE BY DOUG FARAH IN THE WASHINGTON POST ALLEGED THAT
SAMIH OSSAILY, HIS BOSS AND FIRST COUSIN AZIZ IBRAHIM
NASSOUR, AND DIAMOND BUYERS IN THE RUF-HELD AREA OF SIERRA

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: JOHN S BLODGETT
DATE/CASE ID: 23 OCT 2006 200602966

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AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU PRIORITY
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 BRUSSELS 001054

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6 (X1, X5, X6)
TAGS: KVPR, PINR, PINS, PTER, ETRD, BE, XA
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DIAMONDS:SAMIH OSSAILY AND HIS CIRCLE

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PAGE 02 BRUSSE 01054 02 OF 04 011711Z




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ACTION VO-03

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AF-00	AID-00	ACQ-00	CA-01	COME-00
	INL-00	USNW-00	DODE-00	DOTE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00
	EUR-00	E-00	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-00
	LAB-01	NEA-00	DCP-01	NSAE-00	OES-01	SCT-00	SSO-00
	STR-00	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	IIP-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/010W				

-----6E1040 011711Z /38

O 011703Z MAR 02
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4592
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU PRIORITY
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 BRUSSELS 001054

NOFORN


E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6 (X1, X5, X6)
TAGS: KVPR, PINR, PINS, PTER, ETRD, BE, XA
SUBJECT: ANTWERP LINKS TO SHIITE TERRORISTS AND CONFLICT
DIAMONDS:SAMIH OSSAILY AND HIS CIRCLE

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ACTION VO-03

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AF-00	AID-00	ACQ-00	CA-01	COME-00
	INL-00	DODE-00	DOIE-00	SRPP-00	DS-00	EB-00	EUR-00
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	NEA-00	DCP-01	NSAE-00	OES-01	SCT-00	SSO-00	STR-00
	TRSE-00	USIE-00	ASDS-01	IIP-00	DSCC-00	DRL-02	NFAT-00
	SAS-00	/010W					

-----6E1046 011711Z /38

O 011703Z MAR 02
FM AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4593
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY FREETOWN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU PRIORITY
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 04 OF 04 BRUSSELS 001054

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14. COMMENT: THIS MESSAGE -- VERY MUCH "IN THE WEEDS" -- IS
DESIGNED TO FILL IN GAPS IN THE MOSAIC BEING PIECED TOGETHER
IN WASHINGTON. PERHAPS OTHERS ON THE ADDRESSEE LIST WILL
HAVE BITS TO ADD. END COMMENT.

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